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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many health experts argue that “the American health system is a work in 
progress; it can and . . . will get better.”2  Unfortunately, for individuals like Barbara 
Garvey, the health care system had not progressed fast enough to save her life.3  In 
1994, Barbara Garvey was vacationing with her husband in Hawaii when large 
bruises began to appear on her body.4  She immediately went to a local clinic and 
was admitted into the oncology department at the Queen’s Medical Center in 
Hawaii.5  After trying remedial procedures, her doctors diagnosed her with aplastic 
                                                                
2See Paul M. Ellwood Jr. & George D. Lundberg, Managed Care: A Work in Progress, 
276 JAMA 1083-86 (1996). 
3See Transcripts of Clinton Remarks in Patients’ Bill of Rights Roundtable, U.S. 
NEWSWIRE, July 20, 1998. 
4See Id. 
5See Id. 
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anemia and recommended that she undergo a bone-marrow transplant.6  Several days 
into Mrs. Garvey’s treatment, her Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), a third-
party payor (like self-insured employers),7 conducted a prospective utilization review 
process—in which the third-party payor determines whether or not it will reimburse 
the patient for a medical procedure.8  Upon completing the procedure, her HMO 
refused to pay for her treatment in Hawaii and furthermore, ordered that she return to 
Chicago where she could be treated by one of the HMO-designated providers 
(doctors).  
Following a last-ditch plea by Mrs. Garvey’s husband, their HMO reiterated its 
refusal to pay for her bone-marrow transplant in Hawaii and she was forced to fly 
back to Chicago on a commercial airline.9  Mrs. Garvey’s condition left her without a 
functional immune system.  As Mr. Garvey testified at a roundtable sponsored by 
President Clinton on Patient’s Bill of Rights legislation: “We had to take her from 
isolation, put her on a commercial flight and expose her to all the impurities of 
recirculated air [and] the pressure changes, which most people here it wouldn’t affect 
at all, but [to] somebody in her condition could, and may have, proved fatal.”10 
Due to her weakened state, Mrs. Garvey suffered a stroke in mid-flight.  Nine 
days later she died, never becoming stable enough to receive the bone-marrow 
transplant in Chicago.11 
                                                                
6See Id. 
7See Kathleen J. McKee, Liability of Third-Party Health-Care Payor for Injury Arising 
from Failure to Authorize Required Treatment, 56 A.L.R. 5th  737, n.4 (1998).  Third-party 
payor is a term used to describe entities responsible for paying health care services made on 
behalf of plan participants.  Id.  Examples of third-party payors are: insurance companies, 
managed care entities (HMOs, PPOs, IPAs), Medicare and Medicaid, and self-insured 
employers.  Id. 
8See Id. at § 2(a) Although the HMO demanded Mrs. Garvey’s return, her doctor in 
Hawaii said she was not stable enough to be moved that far of a distance.  Transcript of 
Clinton Remarks in Patients’ Bill of Rights Roundtable, supra note 3.  Mr. Garvey phoned 
Chicago and spoke to a doctor working for the HMO.  Id.  The doctor agreed with Mr. Garvey 
that his wife was in no condition to be moved.  Id.  The same day that this conversation took 
place, the doctor working for the HMO, who agreed that Mrs. Garvey should not be removed, 
was taken off the Garvey case.  DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP COMMITTEES, SPECIAL REPORTS: 
PATIENTS BEFORE PROFITS: 18 REASONS FOR HMO REFORM, (visited Mar. 29, 1999) 
<http://www.senate.gov/~dpc.patients_rights/> [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORTS: PATIENTS 
BEFORE PROFITS].  A new doctor assumed control and demanded Mrs. Garvey must return to 
Chicago at the Garvey’s expense.  Id.  Mr. Garvey requested a medivac to ensure and safe and 
sterile travel.  Id.  Their HMO refused, citing expense and awaited Mrs. Garvey’s return in 
Chicago.  Id. see also Larry Pittman, ERISA’s Preemption Clause and the Health Care 
Industry: An Abdication of Judicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV. 355, 356 (1994).  
Prospective utilization review is a process where a third-party payor (self-insured employer or 
HMO, among others) deems whether or not treatment is medically necessary.  Id.  Upon its 
decision as to whether or not the treatment is medically necessary, the third-party payor 
informs the patient and/or the provider on whether or not the third-party payor will grant or 
deny payment.  Id.   
9See Transcripts of Clinton Remarks in Patient’s Bill of Rights Roundtable, supra note 3. 
10See Id. 
11See Id. 
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While Mrs. Garvey’s HMO’s acts were reprehensible, even more disturbing is 
the fact that Mrs. Garvey’s surviving family was denied any and all state law claims 
because of a preemption clause in the 1974 Employment Retirement Income 
Securities Act (ERISA).  The preemption clause denied Mrs. Garvey’s family all 
state remedies and affords her family only those remedies set forth in ERISA.  The 
clause states, in part, that ERISA itself “supersede[s] any and all State laws” as they 
relate to health-benefit plans.12  In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. W. Dedeaux, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a state law cause of action is preempted by [the 1974 
Employment Retirement Income Securities Act] if [the action] relates to an 
employee-benefit plan.13  The Court held that because ERISA already includes a civil 
enforcement mechanism—which affords patients the ability to bring a civil action to 
obtain compensation for plan benefits refused, injunctions against refusals by plans 
to pay benefits, and attorney’s fees—Congress did not intend to permit other 
remedies such as punitive damages in state courts for tortious claims by plan 
participants.14 
Compounding this disturbing situation, the lower federal courts maintain that 
while they are troubled by apparent injustices being committed against patients like 
Mrs. Garvey, it is not their responsibility to remedy the situation.  They suggest, 
rather, it is Congress’ responsibility to revisit ERISA and to reevaluate the 
preemption clause and its adverse effect on patients.15 
Although unjust and highly controversial, the Garvey incident is not unique 
within the American health care system experience.16  Incidents like this have 
prompted serious debate in Congress as to whether immunity for third-party payors 
from state law actions is a form of immunity with which a country with arguably the 
best health care and legal systems in the world can live.  In response to the Garvey 
ordeal and incidents like it, many entities—doctors, lawyers, patients, and politicians 
(Republican and Democrat)—argue that a patient’s bill of rights law must be passed 
that includes a measure eliminating the preemption clause so as to protect patients 
from third-party payors who are sacrificing medical ethics to business profits.17  
Proponents of the bill state that approximately 125 million people currently enrolled 
in health care plans have no opportunity for substantive legal remedy, because their 
third-party payors are exempt from being sued for punitive damages for injuries 
                                                                
1229 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1998). 
13Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). 
14Id. at 52.  The ERISA civil enforcement mechanism is located at 29 U.S.C. § 1132 
(1999).  In addition to the civil enforcement mechanism, ERISA provides two other remedies: 
(1) 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (1999): Criminal penalties for violations of the disclosure and reporting 
provisions of ERISA; and (2) 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1999): notice and a reasonable review must 
be afforded to plan participants for any claims denied.  Id. at 53. 
15See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, Congress: Give Injured Patients Legal 
Recourse By Closing the ERISA Loophole (visited Mar. 3, 1999) 
<http://www.apa.org/practice/erisaloophole.html>. 
16See generally SPECIAL REPORTS: PATIENTS BEFORE PROFITS, supra note 8. 
17The term—patient’s bill of rights legislation—does not encompass one bill per se, but is 
generally used as a generic term for all proposed legislation that surrounds Congress’s current 
deliberation on the state of health care. 
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caused by their decisions to, among others, delay treatment or deny procedures 
recommended by the patients’ doctors.18  Both consumer advocates and medical-
doctor associations urge Congress to eliminate, or significantly alter, the federal-
preemption clause so as to empower people like Mrs. Garvey’s surviving family to 
use the legal system as a means to obtain legal redress in state courts for tortious acts 
committed by third-party payors.19 
Consumer advocates, nor their opponents among HMOs and other third-party 
payors, like to admit that these issues are not cut-and-dried.  They cannot be easily 
resolved by simple alterations to ERISA.  For example, while it appears that Mrs. 
Garvey’s HMO committed an act that should be subject to legal liability, third-party 
payors and their lobbyists maintain that they should not be subject to inconsistent, 
emotional, and outrageously high judgments in state courts, because logical and 
health-related reasons could have accounted for her HMO’s refusal to cover the 
prescribed treatment in Hawaii.20  Furthermore, they argue that while doctors are 
seriously concerned for the health and welfare of patients, doctors make mistakes, 
and their concern with earning a sizable income can affect their ability to provide 
quality care.21  Therefore, third-party payor advocates maintain certain health care 
                                                                
18See POLICY.COM: THE POLICY NEWS & INFORMATION SERVICE, Can Managed Care Be 
Managed: Erisa Reform, (visited Jan. 31, 1999) <http://www.policy.com/issue 
wk/98/0608/060898d.html>.  Consumer advocates argue that health care providers (doctors) 
and their managed care companies need to assume more responsibility for their actions.  Id.  
Managed Care Companies argue if the ERISA exemption is lifted, the costs of premiums 
(amount employers pay for their employees health care coverage) will undoubtedly go up.  Id.  
Furthermore, in addition to the increased premiums, managed care companies argue this will 
naturally lead to an alarming increase in the number of uninsured people in the country.  Id. 
19Throughout this Article, when referring to state law, the author is encompassing state 
medical malpractice laws.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 400 (Pocket ed. 1996).  These 
references do include state law or common law which place a general duty of reasonable care 
on an individual who performs on behalf of another for which a breach of that duty will 
subject the breaching part to liability for damages caused by the breach.  See BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 400 (Pocket ed. 1996). 
20Interview with M. Ruth Coleman, president and CEO of Health Design Plus, in Hudson, 
Ohio (Feb. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Interview with Coleman].  The HMO could have made their 
decision to deny her the treatment in Hawaii because the bone marrow transplant was too 
much for Mrs. Garvey’s body to handle.  Id.  Furthermore, there is a real possibility of medical 
malpractice by the doctor and the HMO may have wanted to protect itself from liability for 
allowing an unapproved provider to administer health care to their patient.  Id.  M. Ruth 
Coleman stated that she recently had a client, whose employee’s doctor prescribed that the 
employer’s employee needed a bone marrow transplant.  Id.  The employer was concerned 
with such an extreme measure and wanted to obtain a separate opinion on the matter.  Id.  M. 
Ruth Coleman’s company, Health Design Plus, obtained three reputable doctors from the 
Northeast Ohio region.  Id.  They were informed of the matter and told that the original doctor 
prescribed a bone marrow transplant.  Interview with Coleman, supra note 21.  Following the 
review of this matter, all three doctors stated if this employee-patient goes through with the 
bone marrow transplant, she will die on the operating table.  Id.  See also MICHAEL L. 
MILLENSON, DEMANDING MEDICAL EXCELLENCE: DOCTORS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 156-60 (1997). 
21See MILLENSON, supra note 20, at 298.  In a Forbes magazine article, in 1986, Dr. James 
Silverman, chief of staff at Stanford University Medical Center, stated, “[Back then] There 
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claim decisions, while seemingly callous, are in fact calculated to provide cost-
efficient solutions that are in the best interest of the patient and that seek to avoid 
possible mistakes by doctors.22  Lastly, this free-market contingent of third-party 
payors argue that over the past twenty years, America’s insured patients have been 
afforded health care at virtually no cost to themselves.23  The insured American 
patient has come to expect quality affordable heath care at no financial risk, even 
though the costs of such care could produce “an irrational health care system” in 
which health costs will never stop increasing.24  Therefore, this free-market 
contingent concludes that if America’s insured patients’ unrealistic assumptions 
motivate significant alteration to, or elimination of, the preemption clause, they will 
be forced to increase premiums to offset any increased liability costs.  If that does 
not work, they threaten that they will exit the health care benefits business altogether 
and leave patients to fend for themselves in securing affordable health insurance.25 
                                                          
was no shortage of work, and everyone was happy. At the beginning of the year, doctors 
would target their income and reach it in a number of ways.  You could always charge for lab 
tests you didn’t do.”  Id.  In the magazine, Mother Jones, Alan Stone, professor of law and 
medicine at Harvard, stated, “when you introduced the profit motive into health care, the 
whole industry became permeated with greed.”  Id. at 299-300.  This “uncontrolled greed” is 
the basis for any managed care situation that we must deal with today.”  Id. at 299. 
22See Wendy K. Mariner, Business vs. Medical Ethics: Conflicting Standards for Managed 
Care, 23 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 236, 240 (1995).  A patient’s legal relationship to her HMO is 
one that is based on contract principles.  Id.  See  Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts, (St. 
Paul: West, vol. 1, 1993).  The elements that underlie and enforceable contract are: an 
exchange of promises; a fair bargaining process; and a meeting of the minds.  See Mariner, 
supra note 23, at 240.  According to Wendy Mariner, there are fundamental differences 
between the relationship created by contract principles and a relationship based on fiduciary 
obligations from doctor to patient.  Id.  For example, a doctor has a fiduciary responsibility to 
act in the best interests of her patient; whereas, in a contractual relationship, if an HMO does 
not provide care that is not set forth in the contract, it is not treating its patients unethically or 
unjustly, even if the patient, such as Mrs. Garvey, needs the care.  Id. 
23See Mariner, supra note 22, at 240.  “For decades, employers providing health insurance 
for the employee was like the employer buying them a mink coat every-year . . . we have 
created in this country an expectation that’s very different than a lot of other countries in that 
the consumer expects the best, that they have the rights to be treated at the ‘nth degree’ until 
they draw their last breath . . . this isn’t necessarily negative, but the fact remains, we have that 
expectation.”  Id.  See also  Alycia C. Regan, Note, Regulating the Business of Medicine: 
Models for Integrating Ethics and Managed Care, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 635, 684 
n.12 (1997).  See also MARK A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY & MORALS: PHYSICIANS’ 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 55-57 (1993).  The vast majority of health care costs are paid through 
third-party payers.  Id. at 13-14.  Therefore, consumers do not have to assume any kind of 
substantive economic responsibility.  Id.  The only adverse economic effect to the patient 
comes through an annual increase in premium payments.  Id. 
24See RANDOM HOUSE UNABR. DICTIONARY 1026 (Stuart Berg Flexner ed., 2d ed. 1993).  
See also Emily Friedman, United States’ Health Care System Called ‘Irrational,’ 58 HOSPS. 
33 (1984). 
25See Telephone interview with David Eubanks, manager, Benefits Administration for 
Marathon Oil Co. and chair of the National Employee Benefits Institute Foundation Policy 
Board (Feb. 26, 1999).  [hereinafter Telephone interview with Eubanks]. 
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On the other hand, patient and consumer-rights groups have their own 
substantive arguments.  These advocates point out that while third-party payors 
predict that the elimination of the preemption clause will be too costly for their 
businesses, they neglect to inform the public that the CEOs of the third-party payor 
companies and corporations are making astronomical salaries.26  Families USA, a 
consumer rights group, studied health care companies’ filings with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.27  In 1997, it found: 
The 25 highest paid executives in the 15 companies studied made $128.6 
million in annual compensation, excluding unexercised stock options.  
The average compensation for these 25 executives was over $5.1 million 
per executive.  The median compensation for these [same] 25 executives 
was $3.5 million.28 
Jamie Court, director of Consumers for Quality Care, a California-based 
watchdog group states, ‘[f]or-profit HMOs take as much as thirty cents of every 
premium dollar for their own profit and overhead, so the real fear of HMOs is that 
reform legislation[, elimination of the preemption clause,] will cut profits and 
redirect dollars from companies’ coffers to patients’ care.’29  Consumer-rights groups 
maintain that the idea of eliminating the preemption clause should not be squelched 
by a highly-suspect fear that third-party payors would be forced to fold their 
operations under the burden of resulting lawsuits and increased liability insurance.30  
Consumer-rights groups also posit that when a self-insured employer or HMO denies 
necessary medical treatment to the employee/patient, she could suffer irreparable 
damage—e.g., death or serious injury.31  Therefore, according to Terre McFillen 
Hall, executive director of the Center for Patient Advocacy: “If HMOs [or self-
insured employers] are making medical decisions, and in essence that’s what they’re 
doing . . . then they should be held accountable just like any doctor who makes 
medical decisions.”32  McFillen Hall further argues that since federal courts have 
predominantly refused to hold third-party payors liable until the ERISA preemption 
                                                                
26See FAMILIES USA, CORPORATE COMPENSATION ON AMERICA’S HMOS, (Sept. 1998) 
<http://www.familiesusa.org/ceo2htm>. 
27See Id. 
28See Id.  Stephen Wiggins, chairman and CEO of Oxford Health Plans, Inc. made 
$30,735,093 in 1997.  Id.  Wilson Taylor, chairman and CEO of CIGNA Corp. made $12, 
456,169 in 1997.  Id.  The report also found: “The 25 executives with the largest unexercised 
stock option packages in 1997 had stock options valued at $290.4 million.  The average value 
of unexercised stock options for these 25 executives was $11.6 million.  The median 
unexercised stock option package for these executives was $7.3 million.”  Id. 
29See THE FOUNDATION FOR TAXPAYER AND CONSUMER RIGHTS, HMO INDUSTRY TAKES 
SCARE TACTICS ROAD: “JOB KILLER” RAP MEANT TO STOP HMO REFORMS, (visited Mar. 3, 
1999) <http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/public_hts/medical/press/me/ 00137.htm> 
(quoting Jamie Court, director of Consumers for Quality Care). 
30Id. 
31See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 15. 
32See Id. (citing BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, HEALTH CARE POLICY REPORT (Apr. 20, 
1998) (quoting Terre McFillen Hall)). 
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clause is altered or eliminated, it strengthens and intensifies the arguments for 
Congressional elimination of the clause.33  Consumer advocates reason that the third-
party payors must take a step back and “concede [that] there are fundamental 
problems which gave rise to the [patient’s] ‘bill-of-rights’ movement in the first 
place[, and, that] the failure of managed care in many instances [was its inability] to 
reconcile cost containment with more humane considerations.”34  They conclude that 
the elimination of the preemption clause would be as good a beginning as any in 
initiating this reconciliation. 
Pure guilt or innocence do not exist in the discussion about the fate of the 
preemption clause.  To move into the next millennium with an efficient, but humane 
health care system, this article argues that the various entities—patient, provider, and 
third-party payor—must each assume responsibility in providing for and accepting 
quality health benefits at an affordable cost.  For over twenty-years, the preemption 
clause has served our health care system for better or for worse.  Although 
increasingly troubled by the preemption clause’s effect on patient’s health, the many 
federal courts hold that the preemption clause language is clear and that it is 
Congress’s responsibility to remedy the harm being inflicted on individuals such as 
Mrs. Garvey.35 
This article explores the arguments surrounding the fate of the preemption clause 
and argues that Congress must work to preserve self-insured employers’ 
accountability to its employees while concurrently retaining the services of self-
insured employers in the health care business.  Part II analyzes the federal 
government’s relationship with the health care industry, concentrating selectively on 
four episodes of federal regulation which helped create the health care crisis that we 
encounter today—the Hill-Burton Act, the Congressional amendments to the Health 
Professions Educational Assistance Act, the advent of Medicare, and ERISA.36  
Armed with this understanding, Congress’s evaluation of health care issues, 
specifically the elimination of the preemption clause from ERISA, may be able to 
avoid repeating history by committing the same mistakes as have been committed 
over the past fifty-years of federal regulation of the health care industry.  Part III 
focuses on various arguments as to whether Congress should amend ERISA to allow 
participants to sue self-insured employers and HMOs for punitive damages under 
state tort law.37  It explains why and how the preemption clause was drafted into 
ERISA, explores the federal courts’ interpretations of the clause and the arguments 
surrounding its abolition, and analyzes the possible repercussions that such a 
measure, if passed, would have on four major entities—patient, provider, self-
insured employer, and health care entities.  Part IV attempts to resolve the current 
                                                                
33See Id. 
34Patients’ Bill of Rights Deserves Consideration, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER PROPERTY & 
CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFITS MANAGEMENT, Feb. 9, 1998, at 40. 
35See supra note 15. 
36Letter from M. Ruth Coleman, president and CEO of Health Design Plus, a national 
Health Care Managed Organization, to Damon H. Taylor, Article Author (Feb. 5, 1999) (on 
file with author). 
37See Bulletin from The National Employee Benefits Institute Foundation to all associate 
members on, WASHINGTON STATUS REPORT, (Jan. 29, 1999) (on file with author). 
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arguments on eliminating the ERISA preemption clause by providing some practical 
suggestions to manage our looming health care crisis. 
II.  SELECTIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF 
AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
For the last fifty-years, most American patients indulged themselves with the 
benefits of a quality health care system.  Joseph Califano, an author and veteran of 
the health care industry, states, “Americans have gotten more tests, seen more 
physicians, spent more time in hospitals for minor medical procedures, taken more 
drugs, had more medical examinations, and been subjected to more unnecessary 
surgery than any other people in the world.”38  Furthermore, the patient has enjoyed 
the miracles of modern medicine at virtually no cost to herself or her family.39  “By 
the late 1960s, approximately ninety-percent of the United States population had 
private-or public health insurance that reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis just 
about any care doctors and hospitals deemed necessary.”40  America’s insatiable 
appetite for more and better health care has not, however, equated to a wonderful 
health care system today.41  What resulted were more problems:  Congress’s 
unwillingness to refuse the nation’s health care desires; doctors want higher fees; 
hospitals more facilities and beds to fill; and patients demanding more services at a 
cheaper cost.  For every law or regulation passed, it seemed, there was an 
undesirable outcome, a bigger and more formidable problem than the one addressed 
in the legislation.  This section illustrates this point by selectively reviewing a series 
of legislative events: the Hill-Burton Act, Congressional amendments to the Health 
Professions Educational Assistance Act, the advent of Medicare, and the 1974 
Employee Retirement Income Securities Act.  
These legislative actions built the foundation for the current discussion on the 
fate of the ERISA preemption clause.  Future deliberations must be grounded in past 
lessons learned rather than upon highly publicized, often anecdotal, instances of 
managed health care abuse.42 
A.  The Hill-Burton Act 
From 1789 through 1945, the United States government’s involvement in health 
care was limited to creating a Marine Hospital Service in 1789, studying infectious 
                                                                
38JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: WHO LIVES? WHO 
DIES? WHO PAYS? 56 (1984). 
39See Id. 
40See MILLENSON, supra note 20, at 289.  See also Interview with Coleman, supra note 21.  
The fee-for-service system places a pre-prescribed price for each service provided to the 
patient.  Id. 
41See Coleman, supra note 20.  See also CALIFANO JR., supra note 37, at 57.  Califano 
states as a result of the early-dollar coverage, unlimited choices, and full benefits, the blessed 
benefit of health insurance is no longer viewed as a blessing, but as a credit card.  Id.  “The 
health insurance card that let us enter the third-party, fee-for-service, cost-plus health care 
reimbursement system provided only the illusion of a free lunch.  In reality, we have all paid 
for this meal.  And what we’ve paid has created a health industry colossus.”  Id. 
42See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 57. 
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diseases in the early twentieth century, and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s toying with the 
idea of inserting health benefits into the 1935 Social Security proposal.43  This 
changed when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.  Immediately, the 
war inspired the nation to defend American freedom and world democracy from 
imperialists, fascists, and dictators alike.  The war effort focused, in part, on creating 
an effective health care industry, one that could provide adequate health training and 
medical research to thousands of nurses and doctors who would be drafted into the 
armed forces.44  By the end of the war, the federal government was funneling large 
sums of money into health care research and supporting this hot new focus.45 
In 1946, state and local governments did not possess the capital to continue 
building hospitals as fast as society needed them.46  Therefore, the President Truman-
led Congress passed the Hill-Burton Hospital Survey and Construction Act.47  This 
began a massive buildup of hospitals and hospital beds.48  During the initial stages, 
the program spent upwards of $700 million on hospital expansion and created 
170,000 new hospital beds.49  By the time the Act expired, it had served as the 
                                                                
43See Id. at 47. 
44See Id. 
45See Id.  In 1930 the National Institute of Health (NIH) was provided with an annual 
budget of $50,000.  Id. Once the war ended the federal government needed a mechanism 
which could assume the newly fostered medical military system, they chose the National 
Institute of Health.  Id.  In 1947, the NIH had a budget of $8 million.  Id.  Moreover, by 1960, 
the NIH budget stood at a hefty $400 million, and in 1984 the budget hit $4 billion.  Id.  In 
1944, Congress decided to empower the U.S. Surgeon General with the ability to conduct 
research on both diseases and the disabilities of man (most likely, Congress was focused on 
providing care for the men wounded throughout the WWII).  Id.  “World War II GI Bill 
education benefits paid for graduate training of doctors to do research at hospitals.  The 
postwar expansion of the Veterans Administration hospital system” created a need for federal 
dollars to support their research efforts.  Id. at 48. 
46See MILLENSON, supra note 20, at 161 
47See J. ROGERS HOLLINGSWORTH & ELLEN JANE HOLLINGSWORTH, CONTROVERSY ABOUT 
AMERICAN HOSPITALS: FUNDING, OWNERSHIP, AND PERFORMANCE 33 (1987).  In addition to 
the new found fervor for health care in this country, it became increasingly obvious that there 
were many communities, small towns, and rural areas especially, that could not support a 
public or voluntary hospital.  Id.  “Funds were made available under the Hill-Burton program 
for both new construction and renovation of existing facilities . . . .  Hill-Burton funding was 
allocated to states according to their per capita income and health needs—the states that were 
most ‘underbedded’ received the largest sums of the money, and those with the most beds for 
their population received proportionately smaller sums.  The legislation was intended not 
simply to provide beds but to provide them in areas of acute shortage.”  Id. The Hill-Burton 
Act had three simple, yet distinct goals: (1) to motivate the states to complete both a needs 
assessment and inventory of their hospital infrastructure; (2) to provide federal monies for the 
construction of new hospitals; and (3) to stimulate local investments, statutorily required by 
the federal government to receive federal assistance.  Id. 
48See Id.  See also CALIFANO, supra note 38, at 49.  When the law expired in 1978 “the 
program had used $4.4 billion in federal money as leverage to get state and local governments 
to ante an additional $9.1 billion. These funds built almost half the hospital beds in use in 
1985.”  Id. 
49See MILLENSON, supra note 20, at 161. 
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catalyst for creating more than 500,000 beds.50  Overall, the Hill-Burton Act caused a 
30% increase in voluntary hospitals and a 119% increase in hospital beds.51  
Unfortunately, Congress miscalculated or rather, did not foresee, the possible 
repercussions of subsidizing the construction of large numbers of hospitals. 
While the increase in hospital beds was instrumental in providing the public—
urban and rural alike—with quality health care facilities, the Hill-Burton Act created 
a massive infrastructure needful of patients to occupy its newly-made beds.52  This 
legislation marked the first miscalculation, in a series of well-intentioned, but short-
sighted, regulatory measures by Congress. Ironically, the second short-sighted 
attempt to regulate the health care system involved Congress’s desire to solve the 
problem caused, in part, by its miscalculation in the Hill-Burton Act—the unused-
bed dilemma. 
B.  Congressional Amendments to the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act 
From the late-1940s through the early-1950s, the delivery of health care in 
America consisted of an increased number of hospitals supplying an increased 
number of services to patients who, as they learned more about their health, 
demanded an increased number of services.53  Unfortunately, doctors were having 
serious difficulty handling the increased patient demand for health care.54  This 
increased demand, coupled with the Hill-Burton Act’s adverse impact on the health 
care infrastructure,55 caused the traditional economic analysis to go awry—hospitals 
were not being used to their capacities, patient’s health care needs were increasing, 
and as a result,  doctors realized an opportunity and began to increase their fees.56 
The federal government intervened as Congress passed a “broad package of 
amendments to the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act to provide funds 
to encourage medical schools to double—from 8,000 to 16,000—the number of 
physicians graduating each year.”57  The hospital lobbying groups convinced 
Congress that training more doctors would increase competition, which would 
naturally decrease fees.  Moreover, training more doctors would solve both the 
                                                                
50See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 49. 
51See HOLLINGSWORTH & HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 47, at 34. 
52See Interview with Coleman, supra note 20. 
53See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 78. 
54See Id. 
55See Interview with Coleman, supra note 20. 
56See CALIFANO JR., supra note 37, at 78.  Many in the federal government felt that the 
doctors had purposely limited the number of doctors graduating to keep their prices from 
decreasing.  Id. 
57See Id.  The then Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services became 
very concerned with this increase in the number of doctors being trained.  Id. at 79.  The 
secretary requested the assistance of the Graduate Medical Education National Advisory 
Committee (GMENAC) to help in determining the number of doctors expected to be working 
in society up until the year 2000.  Id. at 80.  The GMENAC took three years to complete its 
study and concluded that by the turn of the century, this country would have considerably 
more doctors than we would need.  Id. 
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increased demand for services and the unused-bed problem.  Unfortunately, 
Congress, once again, miscalculated the effect their blanket regulation would have 
on the heath-care industry. 
Although the beds were beginning to fill up and the patients’ health care needs 
were being addressed, the large infusion of physicians into the market place resulted 
in an increase, not a decrease in costs.58  In retrospect, health care specialist, John 
Califano Jr. states: 
More doctors meant decidedly higher costs, and more specialists meant a 
richer mix of medical services, a one-two punch ending with an uppercut 
that sent the cost of health care through the roof.  In a system where 
doctors could charge reasonable, customary, and prevailing fees and 
specialists commanded a premium, doubling the number of physicians 
more than doubled what they billed, largely as a result of a 
disproportionate increase in the number of specialists, who got the highest 
fees.59 
The old adage, “for every action, there is an equal reaction and opposite 
reaction,” should have been ringing in the ears of Congress and the nation.  While 
the Hill-Burton Act and the amendments to the Health Professions Educational 
Assistance Act were classic actions of good faith, well-intentioned government 
regulation, they resulted in unexpected outcomes, thus contributing to our current 
health care crisis.60 
C.  The Advent of Medicare 
By no means were the Hill-Burton Act and the amendments to the Health 
Professions Educational Assistance Act the sole culprits in creating the present day 
health care crisis.61  In 1964, newly appointed president Lyndon B. Johnson entered 
the White House carrying with him a dream that Medicare legislation would be 
passed to provide health care for the elderly and the poor.62  He stated in his first 
                                                                
58See Id. “In the economic upside-down cake of medicine . . . more doctors do not 
necessarily mean lower prices.  Indeed, in a provider-controlled system, the more doctors, the 
more medical services; the more surgeons, the more surgery; the more psychiatrists, the more 
fifty minute patient hours on couches; the more specialists, the more referrals to specialists.”  
Id.  The federal government did not account for the reality that physicians controlled prices 
and services and drastic increase of specialization.  Id. 
59See Id. at 80.  Reasonable, customary, and prevailing fees are terms taken from the 
Medicare legislation discussed in section II( c) of this Article. 
60See Interview with Coleman, supra note 20. (The increase in beds combined with the 
increase in doctors created a huge increase in health care costs.  This increase in costs 
continues to escalate as this article is being written).  Id. 
61See Id. 
62See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 50.  Johnson wanted a broad range of measures to be 
passed by Congress.  Id.  He wanted to provide health care for the elderly and the poor.  Id.  
See also ROBERT D. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAW 72 (7th ed. 1996).  Medicare 
was created when Title XVIII was added to the 1965 Social Security Act.  Id.  This title added 
a two part program for health insurance which covered the elderly citizens.  Id.  Part A dealt 
with hospital insurance programs and Part B dealt with supplementary medical insurance 
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speech to Congress, “We are going to fight for medical care for the aged as long as 
we have breath in our bodies.”63  Unfortunately, while Johnson was rightfully 
concerned with access to medical care, he did not envision, and was not interested in, 
the long term ramifications that such a program would have on the future of health 
care.  When Johnson demanded that the Medicare bill be moved out of the 
committee, lobbyists argued that the bill would cost “a half-billion dollars to make 
the changes in reimbursement standards to get the bill out of the Senate Finance 
Committee.”64  Johnson was alleged to respond, “Five hundred million. Is that all?”65 
To win this fight, President Johnson made serious concessions to powerful 
lobbying groups—the American Medical Association (AMA), the American 
Hospital Association, Blue Cross and other insurance carriers, among others—in 
order to obtain support for Medicare.66  When Medicare and Medicaid were finally 
passed, the legislation included provisions stipulating that the federal government 
must pay “hospitals on the basis of what their services cost, and doctors their 
reasonable, customary, and prevailing fees.”67  It turns out, this payment scheme, 
while providing a consistent payment standard, also served as the catalyst for the 
creation of the first major national health care standard, thereby altering health care 
provision forever.68  This standard-of-care permitted American jurisprudence to 
begin considering medical malpractice suits throughout the nation;69 it motivated 
                                                          
dealing with physicians’ services, medical supplies, ambulance services, and other tests such 
as x-rays and lab tests.  Id. at 73. 
63See MILLER, supra note 62, at 73. 
64See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 52. 
65See Id. 
66See Id.  In order to build enough support, Johnson had to make various concessions, 
including one that would come back to haunt the nation.  Id. at 51.  In order to persuade the 
American Hospital Association and some insurance providers to support his idea he 
acquiesced to a provision that stipulated hospitals would be paid their “reasonable costs” of 
providing health care to the elderly.  Id.  Furthermore, the legislation would also involve 
amending the Kerr-Mills program thereby creating what is known as Medicaid.  Id.  But again, 
Johnson had to include a provision which would also come back to haunt the federal 
government.  Id.  This time, the legislation was amended to appease the American Medical 
Association.  Id. The provision stipulated that physicians fees would be paid for by the 
program when they “were ‘reasonable,’ ‘customary,’ and in line with those ‘prevailing’ in 
their community.”  Id. 
67See Id.  At the time congressman and senators rebuked doctors’ arguments that this was 
poor legislation by stating, “you’re free of government interference, even on your fees, and a 
lot of your nonpaying patients will now be sources of income to you.”  Id.  See also Interview 
with Coleman, supra note 20.  Califano’s statement as to a doctor’s ability to “charge 
reasonable, customary, and prevailing fees” was referencing Medicare’s impact on the health 
care system.  CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 51. 
68See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 55. 
69See Id. Up through the mid-twentieth century, to avoid a malpractice suite, the physician 
needed only to abide by the standard-or-care set forth by the community in which she 
practiced.  Id. 
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physicians to over-treated patients so that they could avoid liability; and it led to a 
drastic increase in malpractice-insurance premiums.70 
One must remember that Congress was still playing the traditional health care 
regulating game—the more doctors and hospitals, the more competition, the more 
efficient and less costly the services.71  Unfortunately, “Doctors’ fees rose rapidly 
and physicians enriched the treatment of many patients far beyond what was 
medically appropriate” because doctors were not being regulated and federal monies 
were distributed freely under Medicare through the “reasonable, customary and 
prevailing fee standard.”72  While Medicare can take much of the credit for 
improving America’s health—extending the life span and improving the quality of 
life for the senior citizen, and drastically improving the health care for the poor—an 
unwanted effect did result and involved the cost-based, fee-for-service 
reimbursement system.73  According to author Michael Millenson: “[Medicare] 
became a blank-check for American hospitals and doctors, and they didn’t hesitate to 
draw on the account.”  Although physicians earnings in 1965 were already five times 
the median average income, the rate of increase in their fees promptly doubled.”74 
The advent of Medicare is yet another illustration of federal regulation designed 
to solve short-term dilemmas leading to negative long-term results.  Medicare, 
although nobly providing health care for the elderly and the indigent, created a 
system that invited massive fraud, thereby drastically increasing health care 
                                                                
70See Id.  The establishment of national standards created a form of liability imposed on 
physicians and hospitals when they failed to reasonably conduct every possible test in treating 
the patient.  Id.  As a result, if a hospital’s or a physician’s behavior failed to meet the 
stringent national standard, they would be found negligent and often, the jury would award 
large monetary damages as compensation.  Id.  In 1984, doctors were paying approximately $2 
billion dollars in malpractice insurance and hospitals were paying around $1.5 billion in 
payments.  Id. 
71See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 53. Immediately following the passage of Medicare, 
Congress pushed through a number of bills to train more doctors and nurses and build more 
hospitals.  Id.  See also supra p. 9 and note 60.  Remember, the Hill-Burton Act and the 
amendments to the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act were drafted with the belief 
that the health care industry operated via traditional economic rules.  See CALIFANO JR., supra 
note 38, at 53. 
72See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 55.  See also supra p. 5 and note 31.  See generally 
MILLENSON, supra note 20, at 163-166.  “In 1974, a House subcommittee held the first hearing 
on inappropriate surgery and concluded that the number of unneeded procedures had grown 
about 20 percent.”  (since 1966)  Id. at 166.  See generally It’s Time to Operate, FORTUNE, Jan. 
1970. 
73See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 55. 
74See Id.  See also MILLENSON, supra note 20, at 163.  “Despite doctors’ denunciations of 
“socialized medicine, “ the new system encouraged profit maximization.  Before Medicare, 
many doctors essentially conducted their business according to the principles of Karl Marx, 
the father of communism: ‘From each according to his abilities, to each according to his 
needs.’  Physicians charged higher fees to patients who could afford to pay and smaller to 
those who could not.  Medicare, though, promised to pay whatever fee was ‘usual.’  The 
penniless senior citizen was instantly upgraded from charity case to full-fare customer.  Id 
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premiums.75  In sum, Medicare, the Hill-Burton Act, and the amendments to the 
Health Professions Educational Assistance Act, all evidence good-faith, blanket-
regulation.  In the short term, the legislation provided glimpses of a quality health 
care system.  But in the long term it hindered the nation’s ability to offer its citizens 
quality health care at affordable prices.76  The evolution of Medicare, however, did 
not signal the conclusion of this trend.  It continued when Congress passed the 
Employee Retirement Income Securities Act in 1974.77 
D.  The Employee Retirement Income Securities Act of 197478  
The Employment Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974 (ERISA) was 
principally designed to protect employees participating in their employer’s pension 
plans.79  ERISA also induced employers to self-insure their health benefits by 
securing the services of a health benefits administrator to fulfill the requisite 
administrative responsibilities while financing the benefits program.80  Just as 
President Johnson acquiesced to doctors and hospitals to obtain support for 
Medicare,81 legislators yielded to powerful employer-funded lobbying groups to 
obtain support for the passage of the act.82  In an attempt to convince employers to 
                                                                
75See generally CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY: READINGS NOTES 
AND QUESTIONS 261-266 (1988) (discusses fraudulent activity related to Medicare and 
Medicaid and specifically concentrates on United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3rd Cir. 
1985)).  See generally MILLER, supra note 62, at 66-69  (explains that those who are involved 
in providing services and supplies for Medicare and Medicaid patients are subject to anti-fraud 
and abuse requirements under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b and are often litigated in cases such as 
United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989)); accord United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 
68 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985); see also United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 
1447 (9th Cir. 1985); but see United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979). 
76See infra note 25. 
77See MILLENSON, supra note 20, at 171.  See also MILLER, supra note 62, at 85.  “ERISA 
applies to self-funded employer benefit plans. ERISA is designed to permit employers to offer 
uniform benefits nationwide.  It preempts nearly all state regulation of such plans, so that 
ERISA-qualified plans are protected from most state law challenges to denial of payment.”  Id.  
There are three levels to any preemption analysis: “(1) all state laws that ‘relate to’ any 
covered employee benefit plan are preempted; (2) there is an exception so that state laws that 
‘regulate insurance, banking, or securities’ are not preempted; (3) most employee-benefit 
plans cannot be deemed to be insurers or banks, so they cannot be subjected to state insurance 
or banking laws.”  Id.  See also Id. at 252.  (ERISA regulates most pension and benefit plans 
for employees—pension, profit sharing, bonus, medical benefits, disability, death benefits, and 
unemployment, among others).  Id. 
78See Employee Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 88 Stat. 
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
79See generally David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in 
Effective Federalism, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427, 443-45 (1987) (the author lists a number of 
instances which demonstrate why Congress felt it necessary to pass such an act). 
80See HAVIGHURST, supra note 75, at 1196. 
81See CALIFANO JR., supra note 38, at 52. 
82See Telephone interview with Eubanks, supra note 25. 
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provide health benefits, legislators drafted and passed a new preemption clause that 
regulates employee-benefit plans and preempts state law applicable to them.  Dave 
Eubanks, the manager of benefits administration for a large multi-national 
corporation, maintains that Congress said to large employers, if you assume more 
responsibility for your employees’ welfare plans, this provision will, in effect, 
protect you from chaotic and inconsistent state standards as well as juries who are 
ready and willing to award large monetary judgments to the plaintiff employees.83  
Clark Havighurst, professor of law at Duke University, wrote in HEALTH CARE LAW 
AND POLICY: 
The purpose of ERISA’s preemptive clause was to give large national 
employers, newly subject to federal regulation of their retirement and 
welfare benefits plans, some assurance that they would face uniform 
requirements.  With respect to employee health benefits, however, ERISA 
substitutes little federal regulation for the state regulation it preempts, thus 
tempting employers to self-insure as a way of escaping regulatory 
requirements.84 
While the preemption clause did nothing to curb self-insured employers from 
avoiding regulation it did, however, permit the self-insured employer to prepare for 
one uniform regulatory system.  The preemption clause effectively shielded self-
insured employers from state regulation in that ERISA preempted or superceded any 
state regulation.  
Because the preemptive clause impedes citizens, like Mrs. Garvey’s family, from 
bringing a state action for negligence, it has become one of the most contentious 
health care issues existing in the debate over patient’s bill of rights legislation.85  In 
the short term, the drafting of the clause seemed to be an appropriate measure to 
extend health care coverage to more employees.  In the long term, however, the 
clause has legitimately become the subject of much anger, litigation, and confusion 
as to the rights of patients against self-insured employers’ and HMOs’ negligent  
behavior.  Attorneys Robert Charrow and Lisa Greenlees argue that while 
preemption was thought to be the key to affording quality health benefits to 
employees, many patient advocates now view the provision as the third-party payor’s 
shield against malpractice actions.86 
Admittedly, the Hill-Burton Act, the amendments to the Health Professions 
Educational Assistance Act, Medicare, and ERISA have helped create one of the 
most technologically advanced health care systems in the world.  Nevertheless, with 
the passage of time, it has become equally apparent that this legislative behavior 
lacked foresight in that it created long-term adverse effects—large antiquated 
hospital facilities, higher health care costs, more expensive specialists, increased 
premiums, mass physician and hospital fraud, wildly expensive malpractice 
                                                                
83See Id. 
84See HAVIGHURST, supra note 75, at 1197. 
85See Id. 
86See Robert P. Charrow & Lisa T. Greenlees, ERISA Pre-Emption—A Law in Search of a 
Doctrine, 27 HEALTH L. DIG. 3, 3 (Mar. 1999). 
1999-2000] ERISA PREEMPTION 149 
insurance, over-prescribed medications, and unjust liability shields for third-party 
payors, among many others.87  
Selective analysis of past federal regulation of health care illustrates that the 
federal government has, unfortunately, sacrificed long term stability for short term 
solutions.88  Congress has been unwilling to say “no” to the American public’s 
unrealistic desires for more care and better care . . . for less money,89 while 
simultaneously acquiescing, first, to large employers and managed care 
organizations, who claim that only through a free-market system will the cost of 
health care be controlled;90 and, second, to employer, doctor, and hospital-lobbying 
groups who are concerned principally with profit margins, checking accounts, and 
dividend payments.91  Congress’s desire to “have it all” has led to the current health 
care crisis.  Understanding that past federal efforts to reform health care, although 
instrumental in building our quality health care system, have not produced fairy tale 
outcomes, current members of Congress and the legal community should summon 
the objectivity necessary for fruitful deliberation on the fate of the preemption 
provision.  This article further argues that another key to wisely deliberating on the 
fate of the preemption clause is to arrive at a substantive legal understanding of the 
clause’s ability to preclude state law from interfering with the relationship between 
self-insured employers, HMOs, and their employee/patients.  
III.  AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ERISA WHICH 
WOULD ALLOW PATIENTS TO SUE EMPLOYERS AND HMOS FOR MALPRACTICE 
UNDER STATE LAW 
From 1974 to the late 1980s, the health care market was dominated by fee-for-
service plans that were not covered by ERISA.92  As a result, the clause’s chilling 
effect on a patient’s ability to sue for punitive damages went untested and unnoticed.  
Not until HMOs and other managed care entities became more involved in health-
benefits distribution in the mid-to-late 1980s, did Congress and the legal community 
begin to comprehend the clause’s adverse repercussions on the health care system.  
Legislative intent behind ERISA is one of many heavily debated issues surrounding 
the clause because, in 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Pilot Life Insurance 
                                                                
87See Interview with Coleman, supra note 20. 
88See generally Michael M. Weinstein, In Health Care, Be Careful What You Wish For, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1998, at D3. (the author discusses the fact that accountability clashes 
with choice.  While the patient wants accountability within the health care system she also 
wants the ability to choose any provider she pleases.).  See generally Albert R. Hunt, Health 
Care Is Issue of the Decade: Anger with System Fuels Pressure for ‘Patient’s Bill of Rights’, 
WALL STREET J., June 25, 1998, at A9 (Americans want what is not possible—better care, 
quality care, for less money). 
89See David S. Broder, Patients’ Rights: No Pain, No Gain, WASH. POST, July 29, 1998, at 
A21. 
90See supra notes 64-79. 
91See HAVIGHURST supra note 75, at 1196. 
92See Charrow & Greenless, supra note 86, at 7.  Fee-for-service plans are considered 
different than the third-party structure that finds protection from liability in ERISA’s broad 
umbrella of preemption.  Id. 
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Company reasoned that Congress’s legislative intent is the key to interpreting ERISA 
and its preemptive affect on state law actions.93  Whereas, third-party payors argue 
Congress drafted the clause to protect third-party payors from inconsistent and 
expensive state law actions; therefore, Congress should not waiver from its original 
purpose and leave the federal preemption clause intact.  Consumer advocates argue 
that times have changed.  While Congress intended ERISA to protect America’s 
employers through the preemption clause’s effect on state actions, the clause is now 
used to protect third-party payors.  Another controversial issue is how the lower 
federal courts’ are interpreting the clause’s language.  To enable Congress and the 
legal community to find common ground on the fate of the preemption clause, this 
section briefly explores the nature of preemption, the clause itself, and whether third-
party payors that conduct prospective-utilization reviews, similar to the one 
conducted by Barbara Garvey’s HMO, can be held legally liable under state law.94 
Section A analyzes the language of the clause and discusses the legislative intent 
supporting the drafting of the ERISA preemption clause and offers three arguments, 
each taking a different slant on Congress’s thought process in including the 
preemption clause.  Section B reviews the federal courts’ interpretations of the clause 
and its application to a patient’s state law claim, highlighting the difficulty in 
balancing the rights of plan participants and the express language of the preemption 
clause by looking at the effects of the federal court rulings on the liability of four 
different entities—employers, plan administrators, managed care entities, and 
utilization review agents.  Section C offers pro and con arguments on the elimination 
of the clause and specifically addresses the impact that the rescission would have on 
health care premiums, uninsured Americans, and the patient’s ability to obtain legal 
redress through state law claims.  Finally, Section D discusses the relationship 
between the preemption provision and four entities—the patient, the provider, the 
self-insured employer, and managed care entities. 
A.  Legislative Intent Behind the ERISA Preemption Clause 
Preemption is a byproduct of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
which provides that federal law supercedes state laws that interfere with, or are 
contrary to federal law.95  In 1974, Congress drafted a broad preemption provision 
                                                                
93See Pilot Life Ins. Co. 481 U.S. 41, 41 (1987). 
94See Adrienne M. Zibelman, The Practice Standard of Care and Liability of Managed 
Care Plans, 27 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 204, 208 (1994) (citing Susan M.C. Payne, Identifying 
and Managing Inappropriate Hospital Utilization: A Policy Synthesis, 22 HEALTH SERVICES 
RES. 709 (1987)).  “Utilization review (UR) evaluates the patient’s medical record in light of 
predefined treatment criteria or expert opinion.  UR is implemented primarily in three forms: 
[(1)] preadmission review [; (2)] concurrent review[;] and [(3)] retrospective review.”  Id.  The 
pre-admission review is conducted by a registered nurse, who examines the patient’s record as 
well as what the insurer’s preferred treatment would be for the specific diagnosis.  Id.  The 
preadmission takes this information and determines what exactly should be done with the 
patient—hospitalization, testing, non-staff physician treatment, among others.  Id.  Concurrent 
review makes sure the treatment does not “exceed the limits of profitability.”  Id.  
“Retrospective review identifies costly patterns of treatment by physicians, diagnosis, or unit, 
and takes corrective action to prevent future losses.”  Id. 
95Hillsborough County Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985) 
(quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211 (1824)).  See also U.S. Const., art VI, cl. 2. “This 
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into ERISA that was broken into three components—the preemption clause, the 
savings clause, and the deemer clause.96  The preemption clause enables federal 
law—ERISA—“[to] supercede any and all State claims” if the claims “relate to any 
employee-benefit plan.”97  The remaining two clauses—savings and deemer—deny 
the insurance, banking, and securities industries the opportunity to escape liability 
created by state law actions and clarify the effect of the savings clause by specifying 
that federal law does not supercede state law actions in cases dealing with insurance 
companies, other insurers, banks, trust companies, and investment companies.98  In 
                                                          
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and 
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing 
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  Id. 
96See Robert Roth, The Effect of ERISA Preemption on Tort Claims Against Employers, 
Insurers, Health Plan Administrators, Managed Care Entities, and Utilization Review Agents, 
7 HEALTH LAWYER 7, 8 (1994-95).  See also Pittman, supra note 8, at 355, 356.  Some 
members of Congress and employers sought to escape the very-real possibility of inconsistent 
judgments and standards created in state courts all over the nation and demanded the presence 
of a preemption clause.  Id.  The clause is codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) 1988.  
Id. at 375, n. 124.  The clause provides, “ (e)xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section, 
the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all 
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described 
in section 1003(a).”  § 1144(a).  According to the author, a “saving clause” was drafted into 
the legislation so as to exempt state insurance laws from the ERISA umbrella of preemption.  
See Pittman, supra note 8, at 375, n. 125.  It reads, “‘nothing in this subchapter shall be 
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates 
insurance.’”  29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988).  See Pittman, supra note 8, at 375, n. 125.  
This clause was consistent with the McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988)).  Id.  It states, ‘“the business of 
insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States 
which relate to regulation or taxation of such business.’”  Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) 
(1988).  “The application of state statutes and common law regulating insurance is limited by 
the ‘deemer clause’ which provides that ‘(n)either an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust 
established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer . . . 
or to be engaged in the business of insurance . . . for purposes of any law of any State 
purporting to regulate insurance companies, [or] insurance contracts.’”  Pittman, supra note 8, 
at 375 n.125 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988)).  The preemption clause has been 
successfully used to defend against employee’s claim for their personal injuries.  Pittman, 
supra 8, at 376. 
97See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1998) The section states: “Except as provided in subsection (b) 
of this section, the provision of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall 
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee 
benefit plan described in section 1003(a). . . .”  Id. 
98See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1998).  The clause states, “[e]xcept as provided in 
subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any 
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”  Id.  See 
also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1998).  This provision of the clause states, “[n]either an 
employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which is not exempt under 
section 1003(b) of this title . . . ., nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed 
to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company.”  
Id. 
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the aggregate, the preemption provision commands that federal law supercede state 
actions if the actions “relate to any employee benefit plan,”99 and, furthermore, 
provides that insurance companies, banks, trust companies, and investment 
companies are not to be construed as employee-benefit plans.100  The federal court’s 
interpretation of the preemption-clause language—“relate to”—has been 
instrumental in dictating how broad, or how narrow, the federal courts apply the 
preemption clause to state law actions.  As mentioned above, the U.S. Supreme 
Court stated that Congress’s intent, or purpose for drafting ERISA is crucial to 
interpreting the language, “relate to,” and central to the fate of the preemption 
clause.101 
Arguably, Congress adopted ERISA to protect members of pension plans and 
health-benefit plans.  ERISA sets forth, “‘standards of conduct, responsibility, and 
obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate 
remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.’”102  Today, Congress’s 
original intent for the scope of ERISA and its preemption clause is vigorously 
debated by lawyers, physicians, self-insured employers, and the courts.103  Third-
party payor lobbyists argue ERISA regulates pension plans and health plans 
sponsored by third-party payors, such as self-insured employers, who provide their 
employees with medical, surgical, or hospital care with a “‘purchase of insurance or 
otherwise.’”104  Whereas consumer advocates argue that ERISA was created on 
behalf of employees.  
Was ERISA passed solely for the protection of pension participants?  If so, why 
did Congress include the preemption clause, thereby depriving patients, “who are 
injured by the negligent actions and decisions of ERISA-regulated managed care 
organizations [and self-insured employers], the right to hold these plans accountable 
for their actions[?]”105 
Patient advocates argue that ERISA was created to protect the interests of 
employees and their dependents; therefore, the preemption clause should not be 
deemed to preclude patients from holding third-party payors liable for their negligent 
decisions.106  They posit that Congress wanted to protect pension participants and cite 
the ERISA legislative record for support.107  For example, in 1974, Senator Biaggi, 
                                                                
99See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1998). 
100See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1998). 
101See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987). 
102See Roth, supra note 96, at 7-8 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)). 
103See Pittman, supra note 8, at 358-59. 
104See Roth, supra note 96, at 7 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)). 
105See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ERISA Managed Care Organizations 
Should Be Held Accountable for Decisions That Harm Patients, (visited Mar. 3, 1999) 
<http://www.apa.org/practice/erisa.html>. 
106See Id.  See also Pittman, supra note 8, at 360.  See generally Marilyn Klinger & James 
P. Diwik, ERISA Preemption and the Surety, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 111, 112-13 (1993). 
107See Pittman, supra note 8, at 360. 
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celebrating the passage of the legislation, stated that ERISA was the “emancipation 
proclamation of workers.”108 
Third-party payors argue that although the interests of employees and their 
dependents was central to the legislation, Congress also wanted to make sure self-
insured employers could economically live with the legislation.109  In 1974, Senator 
Williams stated,  
It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, 
the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute 
are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating 
the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of 
employee benefit plans.  This principle is intended to apply in its broadest 
sense to all actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality 
thereof, which have the force or effect of law.110 
As Dave Eubanks maintains, Congress desired to create legislation that was not 
too onerous on the employer—e.g., Congress did not want to force employers to 
prepare for fifty different sets of regulations.111  Even more, Congress wanted to 
                                                                
108See 120 Cong. Rec. 29, 193 (1974) (statement of Sen. Biaggi).  “The benefits of this 
legislation for some 70 million working men and women will be far reaching and profound.  
Workers are receiving their own version of an emancipation proclamation.  The Pension 
Reform Act will save the American worker from economic anxiety and uncertainty which in 
the past has accompanied retirement.  It will free workers from servitude to unscrupulous 
employers, who seek to deprive their employees of the fundamental right to a pension.”  Id.  
See also 120 Cong. Rec. 29, 197 (1974) (statement by Sen. Javits) (he likened the importance 
of ERISA to that of the development of Social Security, “[ERISA is the] greatest development 
in the life of the American worker since social security.”  Id. 
109See 120 Cong. Rec. 29, 197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent).  Dent felt that the 
preemption was the “crowning achievement” of the entire ERISA legislation.  That it actually 
protects pension participants by eliminating any possibility “of conflicting and inconsistent  
state and local regulations” which could “affect any employee benefit plan” governed by 
ERISA.  Id. 
110See e.g. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 
29,933 (1974) (statement of Sen. William)). 
111See Telephone interview with Eubanks, supra note 25.  Mr. Eubanks argues self-insured 
employers regulated by ERISA were, and are, concerned with the unfortunate, but true 
arbitrary nature of state courts.  Id.  They realize that state courts have judges whose election 
campaigns may be funded partially by plaintiffs lawyers; therefore, the judges might be biased 
against the multi-state companies.  Id.  See also Interview with Coleman, supra note 20. 
Furthermore, certain regions of the country are very protective of their own sons and 
daughters.  Interview with Coleman, supra note 20.  Therefore, a jury may be emotionally 
swayed to rule for their own son or daughter rather than the large, impersonal, but possibly, 
not guilty self-insured employer.  Id.  If the federal preemption was placed in the ERISA 
legislation, the liability resulting from arbitrary factors could lead to unjust legal decisions, 
thereby making an employers ability to provide health benefits an uneconomical decision.  Id. 
See also, Charrow & Greenlees, supra note 86, at 3.  Congress passed ERISA to create 
uniformity in the enforcement of employee benefits.  Id. 
154 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 14:133 
provide the employer with the sanctity of the federal courts, where the damages 
awarded would be limited by the provisions laid out within ERISA.112 
An increasing number of individuals—consumer advocates and physician 
providers, among others—rebuff third-party payor claims by reasoning that 
legislative intent is irrelevant.113  They claim that “ERISA’s preemption language is 
generating litigation that was never anticipated when the statute passed two decades 
ago, and therefore the preemption lawsuits contravene ERISA’s original purpose—
the protection of participants in employee benefit plans.”114  More importantly, they 
argue that the influx of prospective utilization review procedures—evaluation of a 
patient’s medical record in light of predefined treatment criteria or expert opinion115 
—has altered the health care landscape so much that the preemption clause’s adverse 
effect on a patient’s ability to seek legal redress was totally unforeseen by Congress 
in 1974.116  Therefore, legislative intent is irrelevant and ERISA must be changed 
because it is unfair or unjust to deny a harmed patient any sort of compensation 
beyond that provided for in ERISA.117 
                                                                
112Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 52.  The Court outlines three provisions within ERISA 
that serve as the enforcement mechanism for the legislation.  Id.  They are: (1) 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132 provides civil enforcement mechanisms for a variety of issues; (2) 29 U.S.C. § 1131 
provides criminal penalties for violations of the disclosure and reporting provisions of ERISA; 
and (3) 29 U.S.C. § 1133 provides that notice must be given to the beneficiary or the plan 
participant for any claims denied and a reasonable review is offered on that decision to deny.  
Id. at 53.  See also Roth, supra note 96, at 8.  The civil action component, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a), permits, in relative part, that a civil action may be brought by a participant or 
beneficiary for compensation for plan benefits, injunctions against refusals by plans to pay 
benefits, and attorney fees.  Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 52.  The Court in Pilot Life felt 
these three prongs of enforcement provided for a “careful balancing of the need for prompt 
and fair claims settlement procedures against public interest in encouraging the formation of 
employee-benefit plans.  Id.  The Court further felt that the precise inclusion of 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a) demonstrates that Congress did not intend to permit other remedies not included in 
the provision.  Id.  See also AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 15 (details a 
list of courts who have urged Congress to amend ERISA). 
113See Robin Elizabeth Margolis, Is ERISA Preemption the Health Insurance ‘Wrecking 
Ball?,’ 10 HEALTHSPAN 24 (Feb. 1993). 
114See Id. 
115See Zibelman, supra note 94, at 208. 
116See Pittman, supra note 8, at 361.  Up until the early 1980s, medical treatment was paid 
for retroactively.  Id.  Meaning, “physicians and hospitals submitted bills and received 
payments from the government, or from private insurance companies, after the medical 
treatment had already been received by the patient.”  Id.  Unfortunately, the retroactive system 
was not able to control the costs of health care because “the propriety of the treatment is 
considered after the treatment has been rendered and the cost of the care incurred.”  Id.  
Because the Hill-Burton Act created a huge health care infrastructure to support, the 
amendments to the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act created too many doctors, 
and Medicare created a system which permitted incredible abuse.  The cost of health care 
increased from 5% of the Gross National Product to 11% between 1960 and 1983, and then to 
11.6% of the GNP in 1989.  Id. 
117See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 105.  See also Pittman, supra 
note 8, at 362.  As a result, the federal government, private employers, and insurance 
companies created the utilization review mechanism as a vehicle to eliminate excess and 
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Legislative intent behind ERISA is one of many factors that Congress and the 
legal community might take into consideration when deliberating on the fate of the 
preemption clause.  As the third-group of advocates question above, should it be?  If 
the health care landscape has changed so much since the drafting of the preemption 
clause, should not Congress re-evaluate the relationship between third-party payors, 
their patients, and state law actions and leave legislative intent for the history books?  
The lower federal courts think so.  The following section briefly examines the 
federal courts’ analysis of the clause, its effect on a patient’s state law actions, and 
how courts’ analysis could serve as a catalyst for deliberation on the fate of the 
preemption clause.  
B.  The Federal Courts’ Treatment of the ERISA Preemption Provision  
If legislative intent is irrelevant, Congress’s willingness to steer clear from its 
legacy of legislating long-term adverse impacts on the health care delivery system 
may lie in its ability to understand federal courts’ interpretation of the clause and 
their effect on state law.  As this section demonstrates, federal courts struggle with 
the language of the preemption clause and its impact on patients who are precluded 
from protecting themselves and others by using state law actions.  This section 
explores the federal courts’ analysis of the clause, and explores both tort actions 
against third-party payors and the difficulty federal courts are having balancing the 
rights of the patient with the express language of the clause.  This section maintains 
that the discussion in our nation’s federal court rooms can serve as background 
information for Congress as they currently deliberate on the fate of the preemption 
clause. 
When determining the ERISA preemption clause’s scope and reach, the federal 
courts generally conduct a two-part analysis.  In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that because ERISA contains express civil remedies 
within the statute, federal law preempts any state common law tort and contract 
causes-of-action asserting improper processing of claim for benefits under an insured 
employee’s benefit plan.118  The Court reasoned that if it would allow state tort 
actions against ERISA regulated plans, its decision would undermine an expressed 
provision set forth by Congress that already covers remedies.119  The Court stated 
that the first step in determining whether a certain state action, such as a negligent 
claim against a self-insured employer, is preempted by the preemption clause is to 
analyze legislative intent.120  Following a review of the Congressional record, the 
Court, in Pilot Life, determined that the preemption clause was drafted to be 
deliberately expansive, that it was designed to “‘establish pension-plan regulation 
                                                          
useless medical treatments and expenses.  Pittman, supra note 8, at 362.  While these review 
procedures are used to cut “the excess fat” from the health care industry, their is a real fear 
that self-insured employers and benefits managers will use the prospective utilization review 
to deny necessary medical treatments in the name of cost efficiency.  Id. at 363.  Furthermore, 
as long as the denial was made according to plan specifications, ERISA preempts any and all 
state claims.  Id. at 364. 
118See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987). 
119Id. See also Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 1998). 
120Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 44-45. 
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[and employee-benefit plan regulation] as exclusively a federal concern.’”121  The 
Court came to this conclusion only after it discovered that the original draft of 
ERISA—which contained a too narrowly tailored preemption clause—had been 
rejected by Congress in favor of the present broadly-drafted version which affords 
third-party payors more protection state law liability.122 
The second part, also expressed in Pilot Life, requires federal courts to apply the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of this provision to the phrase ‘relates 
to’ as set forth in the preemption clause.123  In Bast v. Prudential Insurance Co., the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit attempted to follow precedent 
and held that “a state law cause of action is [only] preempted by ERISA if it ‘relates 
to’ an employee-benefits plan.”124  According to the court in Bast, since 1983, federal 
courts have interpreted state law relating to an employee-benefits plan, “‘if it has a 
connection with or reference to such plan.’”125 
The United States Supreme Court was subsequently called upon to define what 
exactly “relate to” meant.  The Court, in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,126 held that “[courts] must go beyond 
the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term [relate to], 
and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the 
state law that Congress understood would survive.”127  In District of Columbia v. 
Greater Washington Board of Trade, the Court added that the existence of the 
“connection with or reference to employee-benefit plans” is to be established by 
examining the “objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state 
law that Congress understood would survive, as well as the nature of the effect of the 
state law on ERISA [health] plans.”128  For example, if Mrs. Garvey’s family had 
                                                                
121See Id. at 46 (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)). 
122See Id. at 46.  “The bill that became ERISA originally contained a limited pre-emption 
clause, applicable only to state laws relating to the specific subjects covered by ERISA.  The 
Conference Committee rejected those provisions in favor of the present language, and 
indicated that section’s pre-emptive scope was as broad as its language.”  Id. (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 93-1280, at 383 (1974); S. Rep. No. 93-1090, at 383, (1974); see also Shaw v. Delta 
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98, (1983). 
123See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47.   
124See Id. See also Bast, 150 F.3d at 1007 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)); see, e.g. Corporate 
Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dept. of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 607 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Metroplex 
Infusion Care, Inc. v. Lone Star Container Corp., 855 F. Supp. 897, 900 (N.D. Tex. 1994). 
125Bast, 150 F.3d at 1007 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 
(1990) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Ind., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)). 
126New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995). 
127See Id. at 656.  See also Operating Eng’rs Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. JWJ 
Contracting Co., 135 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1998) (“of late, the [Supreme] Court has come to 
recognize that ERISA pre-emption must have limits when it enters areas traditionally left to 
state regulation . . .”). 
128District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129 (1992).  See also 
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 
317 (1997). 
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decided that the remedies provided for under ERISA were inadequate,129 and sued 
the HMO in state court for negligently denying Mrs. Garvey a bone-marrow 
transplant in Hawaii, the HMO would likely have argued that Mrs. Garvey’s state 
law claim was preempted by ERISA because Congress’s objective was to protect 
self-insured employers.  The federal court would have to follow precedent and look 
to the legislative intent supporting the preemption clause to evaluate if the denial of a 
bone-marrow transplant was “related to” or “connected to” the administration of the 
employee-benefit plan.130  As long as the third-party payor’s decision was based on 
an objective application of the benefit-plan restrictions and not a subjective medical 
decision, more likely than not, the federal court would deem that denying a bone-
marrow transplant was “related to” the administration of an employee benefit plan 
and, therefore, that the state law claim was preempted by ERISA. 
Attempting to provide clarity to ambiguous language in the 1974 ERISA act, the 
U.S. Supreme Court provided the basic outline for the controversial preemption 
analysis.  The preemption clause’s effect on state law, however, becomes most 
controversial when, similar to the Garvey incident, the denial of a patient’s state law 
claim against self-insured employers and other third-party payor entities results in 
death.  This section will begin by providing an overview of the federal courts’ 
analysis of the preemption clause’s effect on tort claims between self-insured 
employers and their plan participants.  Part two of this section will conclude by 
outlining the general difficulty that many federal courts are having with the 
preemption clause’s effect on a patient’s ability to sue, specifically, self-insured 
employers, plan administrators, managed care entities, and utilization review agents.   
1.  Tort Claims Between Self-Insured Employers And Their Health Care Plan 
Participants  
As mentioned earlier, in Pilot Life Insurance Co.,131 the Court held that because 
ERISA contains express civil remedies within the statute, federal law preempts any 
state common law tort and contract cause-of-action asserting negligent processing of 
claim for benefits under an insured employee’s benefit plan.132  The Court held that if 
it would allow state tort actions against ERISA-regulated plans, its decision would 
render moot an expressed provision set forth by Congress.133  Since Pilot Life, courts 
have expanded the Court’s ruling to apply to other state tort actions.134  In Bast, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held that causes of action for 
“breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress”,135 and wrongful death based on a third-party payor’s 
                                                                
129See 29 U.S.C. § 1131; 29 U.S.C. § 1132; 29 U.S.C. § 1133. 
130Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987). 
131See Id.  
132See Id. 
133See Id. see also Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 1998). 
134See Roth, supra note 96, at 8. 
135See Bast, 150 F.3d at 1007-08. 
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negligent administration of a claim, were preempted.136  Furthermore, and of great 
import to the Mrs. Garveys of the world, according to the Supreme Court, in 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, extra-contractual, 
compensatory, and punitive damages are also not permitted under ERISA.137 
Patients, politicians, and providers are understandably troubled by ERISA 
depriving a plaintiff of substantive state law remedies for alleged negligent actions 
by the self-insured employer’s plan administrator, among others.138  In the past, 
national issues such as abortion, civil rights, gender equality were handled within the 
federal court system.  The public has, therefore, come to expect the federal courts to 
provide guidance when struggling with the many systemic problems that plague our 
nation.  With respect to the preemption’s adverse impact on patients’ rights, the 
federal courts, despite minor deviations, refuse to bend and continue to stand 
steadfast in their interpretation of the preemption clause.  In Cannon v. Group Health 
Services, a woman was diagnosed with leukemia and needed a bone-marrow 
transplant.139  Her insurance company denied her request on the basis that the 
procedure was experimental.140  Although the insurance company would later reverse 
its decision, it was too late, and the woman died shortly thereafter.141  The woman’s 
spouse brought an action alleging the insurer negligently or in bad faith refused to 
authorize the procedure in a timely manner.142  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit ruled that ERISA preempts state law claims even if there is no 
alternative remedy under ERISA.143  Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits concurred with the Tenth Circuit when deciding that 
ERISA preempts state laws even if that means the plaintiff, or the plaintiff’s 
dependents, obtain no remedy.144 
                                                                
136See Id.  See also Tingey v. Pingley-Richards West, Inc., 953 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1992) ; 
Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993) (attorney’s fees awarded because 
insurer agreed to pay for medical services only after plaintiff sued to compel coverage, even 
though the wrongful death action was preempted by ERISA). 
137Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); Sokol v. Bernstein, 
803 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1986) (29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) does not permit extra-contractual damages, 
including damages for emotional distress). 
138See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 103.  Terre McFillen Hall, 
executive director of the Center for Patient Advocacy, stated:  “If HMOs are making medical 
decisions, and in essence that’s what they’re doing . . . then they should be held accountable 
just like any doctor who makes medical decisions.”  Id.  Also, Ronald F. Pollack, executive 
director of Families USA, stated, “there’s no question that plans are practicing medicine. What 
plans are saying is: ‘We can practice medicine until we make a mistake, then you shouldn’t 
treat us as if we’re practicing medicine.’”  Id. 
139Cannon v. Group Health Servs. of Okla., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 1996). 
140See Id. 
141See Id. 
142See Id. 
143See Id. 
144Corcoran v. United Healthcare, 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992) (“while we are not 
unmindful of the fact that our interpretation of the preemption clause leaves a gap in remedies 
within a statute intended to protect participants in employee-benefit plans, . . . the lack of 
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In general, the federal courts remain unified in finding that federal law preempts 
state law claims if they relate to employee-benefit plans.  The courts, however, have 
become increasingly troubled with the preemption clause’s chilling effect on harmed 
patients and their dependents’ rights to punish the alleged wrongdoers.145  As a result, 
some federal courts have begun to explore avenues to evade the preemption clause’s 
adverse impact on a patient’s ability to seek state law remedies. 
2.  The Difficulty In Balancing The Rights Of Plan Participants With The Express 
Language Of The Preemption Clause  
In the United States Court of Appeals for the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits, although proscribing federal preemption over state law claims, courts have 
expressed a sense of remorse in having to deny injured or deceased plaintiffs any 
recourse other than that provided for under ERISA.146  The federal courts, 
nevertheless, maintain that if injustices are being committed as a result of federal law 
preempting state law, the judicial branch has no business interjecting its sense of 
justice into policy decisions.147  They further maintain that policy discussions should 
not take place in the courtroom; rather, the Constitution stipulates that it is the 
responsibility of the people through their elected representatives in Congress.148  For 
example, the Fifth Circuit, in Corcoran v. United Healthcare, stated,  
the result ERISA compels us to reach means that the Corcorans . . . have 
no remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious mistake . . . 
Fundamental changes such as widespread institution of utilization review 
would seem to warrant a reevaluation of ERISA so that it can continue to 
                                                          
ERISA remedy does not affect a preemption analysis.”); Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 
F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1995) (that ERISA does not provide the full range of remedies 
available under state law in no way undermines ERISA preemption.”); Cromwell v. Equicor-
Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1276 (6th Cir. 1991) (nor is it relevant to an analysis of 
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145See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 103. 
146See Id. 
147See Id. 
148Cannon v, Group Health Servs. Of Okla., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270, 1270 (10th Cir. 1996).  
(“although moved by the tragic circumstances of this case . . . we conclude that the law gives 
us no choice but to affirm the dismissal of the case on ERISA preemption grounds . . . 
Congress, not this court, is the appropriate forum for policy arguments.”); See Andrews-
Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997) (“tragic events set forth . . . cry 
out for relief . . . Nevertheless, this Court had no choice but to [remove the case] out of state 
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utilization review providers . . . from potential liability for the consequences of their wrongful 
denial of health benefits.”); See Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 1003, (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“the Bast’s state claims are preempted by ERISA, and ERISA provides no remedy.  
Unfortunately, without action by Congress, there is nothing we can do to help the Basts and 
others who may find themselves in this same unfortunate situation.”) 
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serve its noble purpose of safeguarding the interests of employees.  Our 
system, of course, allocates this task to Congress, not the courts.149  
While most lower federal courts adhere to the Pilot Life precedent and mirror the 
sentiments of the Corcoran court; federal courts have, in some rare instances, 
deviated from their strict application of the preemption clause.150  
Beginning with Pilot Life, federal courts have held that state laws that have a 
connection with or reference to health-benefit plans will be preempted.151  In Shaw v. 
Delta Airlines, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state laws that impact 
health-benefit plans in a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” manner are not 
preempted.152  Since this decision, the task of determining when and what impact is 
“tenuous, remote, or peripheral” has proven difficult to apply to the many fact 
patterns that arise involving health plan participants.  Within the federal courts, 
however, four categories are emerging in which the standard “tenuous, remote, or 
peripheral” has been applied and resulted in evasion of federal preemption.153  To 
better able Congress and the reader to understand the issue of eliminating the ERISA 
preemption clause, this section examines how federal courts balance the affects of 
federal preemption with these same four categories: (a) self-insured employers; (b) 
administrators; (c ) managed care companies; and, (d) utilization review agents. 
a.  Liability of Self-Insured Employers 
The liability of a self-insured employer in state court is normally preempted by 
the preemption clause. The federal courts, nevertheless, have found self-insured 
employers liable under two theories—vicarious liability and direct negligence.154  
Vicarious liability assumes that the self-insured employer is able to control the 
behavior of the physician who cares for their employees.155  Vicarious liability is 
difficult to prove and conditional upon the courts’ interpretation of several factors, 
among them: whether the self-insured employer serves as a gatekeeper (i.e., an 
individual who is to decide on whether a patient’s health care claim will be 
reimbursed by the self-insured employer); whether doctors are compensated through 
capitation (i.e., a system of pre-payment to physicians to care for an employee’s 
health); and, whether third-party payors actively evaluate the quality of care 
provided within their plans.156  For example, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit ruled, in Cooney v. South Central Bell Telephone, that an employee’s 
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150See Roth, supra note 96, at 8. 
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152See Id. 
153See Roth, supra note 96, at 8. 
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155See Id. at 5. 
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state law claim of negligence and intentional tort was not preempted.157  The court 
maintained that the self-insured employer’s disregard for the employee’s doctors 
advice and subsequent mandate that the employee return to work was not “related 
to,” but rather “tenuously, remotely, or peripherally” related to, the health benefit 
plans covered by ERISA.158 
Federal courts also look to direct negligence if the plaintiff-employee can 
demonstrate that the self-insured employer “negligently supervised or negligently 
selected” a doctor to be included in its benefits network.159  Federal courts maintain 
that the negligent selection of a physician to be included in the self-insured 
employer’s health-benefit plan network is not “related to” the administration of a 
health-benefit plan, but rather tenuously, peripherally, or remotely connected.160  
b.  The Liability of a Plan Administrator 
As is the case with the liability of self-insured employers, the liability of a plan 
administrator in state court is almost always preempted by ERISA.161  Exceptions to 
the rule occurred in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.162  
In Lordmann Enterprises, Inc. v. Equicor Inc., the Eleventh Circuit stated that 
ERISA did not preempt a state claim for negligent misrepresentation of insurance 
coverage against a plan administrator.163  The court argued that the state law action 
was not preempted for two reasons.  First, preemption was not part of Congress’ 
purpose for ERISA, rather it was designed to protect the interests of the employee 
covered by benefits.164  Therefore, preemption of a patient’s claim against a third-
party provider would defeat rather than promote this goal.165  Second, the court 
argued that health care providers were not foreseen as parties to the ERISA 
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158See Cooney, 998 F.2d at 1014. 
159See Charrow & Greenlees, supra note 86, at 5. 
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161See Roth, supra note 96, at 8.  See Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 129 (9th 
Cir. 1993). 
162See Spain, 11 F.3d at 129. 
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Z15.  The article discussed a similar cause of action which could escape preemption.  Id.  If a 
third-party payor contracts with a doctor who has a past history of malpractice and then harms 
a patient, the patient could argue that both doctor and the third-party payor were negligent.  Id.  
Because the suit anchors on how the doctor was chosen, rather than hpw the plan was 
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164See Lordmann Enters., Inc., 32 F.3d at 1533. 
165See Id. 
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bargain.166  The court reasoned that while ERISA provided federal causes of action 
for employers and employees, it did not “provide a cause of action for aggrieved 
health care providers that treat ERISA participants.”167  
c.  Liability of Managed Care Entities 
The overwhelming majority of cases that involve a patient’s state law claim 
against third-party payors—self-insured employers and managed care entities—are 
preempted by ERISA.  The federal courts treat managed care entities the same as 
self-insured employers for purposes of preemption analysis.168  Federal courts, 
nevertheless, have, at times, found managed care entities liable for state actions 
under vicarious liability.169  But vicarious liability has turned out to be tenuous at 
best in providing avenues to evade the preemption clause’s grip over state law 
claims. 
In Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that a state tort claim of vicarious liability for 
money damages was not preempted by ERISA because it did not relate to ERISA 
and the plaintiff would otherwise be denied adequate relief.170  The court viewed the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service—
“run-of-the mill state law claims such as unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or even 
torts committed by an ERISA plan are relatively commonplace” and not preempted 
by ERISA—as support for its analysis.171  Independence, however, has been 
criticized.172  In Ricci v. Gooberman, M.D., the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey maintained that the court in Independence mistakenly 
interpreted the issue of vicarious liability as it pertains to managed care entities.173  
The New Jersey District Court argued that vicarious liability claims do relate to 
employee-benefit plans and furthermore, that it is inconsistent “to deny preemption 
in vicarious liability claims while allowing preemption in regular negligence 
claims.”174  The federal courts deeming vicarious liability claims outside the scope of 
the ERISA preemption clause is really not a solution.  Rather, the only consistent 
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173See Id. at 317. 
174See Id. at 318. 
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federal court solution is to encourage Congress to re-visit the broad language of the 
clause itself.175 
d.  Liability of Utilization Review Agents 
Utilization review agents are similar to gatekeepers in that they are, often times, 
not  medical professionals, but rather business persons who are responsible for 
deciding whether or not a medical procedure should be reimbursed by the third-party 
payor.  Unlike the aforementioned categories, state law claims against a utilization 
review agent have been consistently found to be preempted by ERISA.  
When analyzing the liability of prospective utilization review agents, the federal 
courts tend to follow the Fifth Circuit precedent in Corcoran v. United HealthCare, 
Inc.,176 which stated that liability of a utilization review agent “arises when a treating 
physician believes that a more aggressive-and usually more-costly treatment is 
warranted, but the third-party payor does not.”177  Because the U.S. Supreme Court 
has not provided a bright-line test with which to evaluate third-party payors’ and 
their utilization review agents’ liability under ERISA, the federal courts seem to base 
much of their decision-making on whether or not third-party payors are making 
medical decisions or “mere determinations regarding processing of benefits when 
denying coverage.”178  That is, if the third-party payor is making a medical decision, 
the courts may hold that that behavior does not relate to an employee-benefit plan 
and is, therefore, not preempted from a state law action.179  If the third-party payor is, 
however, making a determination regarding the processing of benefits, the courts 
will deem the utilization review agent’s action as being immune from state law 
actions.180  Following the Corcoran decision, the Seventh, the Eighth, the Ninth, and 
the Tenth Circuits have found suits against the utilization review agent preempted, 
because rather than involving medical decisions, the suits were found to pertain to an 
issue of “negligent administration of benefit claims.”181 
Despite the lower federal courts’ rare deviation, the preemption of state law 
claims has emerged largely unscathed as to the federal courts’ interpretation of the 
legislative intent supporting ERISA and the expressed language of the broad 
preemption clause.  As a result, politicians, consumer advocates, and providers are 
vociferously calling for Congressional intervention.  If one adds pleas for 
Congressional reform by the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, it seems there is 
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a formidable movement afoot to urge Congress to, once again, meddle in the health 
care industry by eliminating the preemption clause.  This movement could result in 
federal legislation that would create a reasonable balance between employee-patients 
rights and their third-party payors—self-insured employers and health-management 
entities—or exacerbate an already critical health care dilemma.  The following 
section will explore the pros and cons of such an action.  
C.  Brief Exploration of the Politically-Charged Discussion Involving the 
Elimination of the ERISA Preemption Clause 
Throughout the ongoing discussion as to whether Congress should meddle with 
health care through a patient’s bill of rights, a consensus has formed among patient 
advocates, self-insured employers, politicians, and providers.  They argue that the 
fate of the preemption clause is the key to the 106th Congress’s deliberation on what 
would be the first health care reform bill of the new millenium.182  They point to the 
federal judicial system which has spoken loud and clear—holding that the fate of the 
preemption clause lies, not within the judicial branch, but, rather, within the 
legislative branch.183  For patients, however, wishing to resolve the matter quickly, 
both within Congress and throughout the nation, there are two heavily-entrenched 
camps that diametrically oppose one another. 
One side of this health care battle is chiefly controlled by self-insured employers, 
managed care entities, and defense trial attorneys, among others.  The opposing side 
is spearheaded by physicians, consumer advocates, and plaintiff trial lawyers.  The 
first coalition—self-insured employers, among others—is strongly opposed to 
eliminating the preemption clause.  They argue that elimination of the clause will 
raise premium costs, limit coverage, reward the trial bar with unnecessarily large 
amounts of money, and lead to complex inconsistent systems of interpreting plan 
practices.184  Therefore, if Congress is truly concerned with the delivery of quality 
health care at an affordable cost, the preemption clause should be left alone.185  The 
second coalition—physicians and consumer advocates, among others—argues that 
the retention of the current broadly-construed preemption clause continues the trend 
of depriving patients, like Mrs. Garvey, the right to punish third-party payors for 
negligently disrupting the delivery of quality health care.186  This coalition, in a 
resonating voice, argues that third-party payors, who commit negligent acts towards 
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JOURNAL’S CONGRESS DAILY, July 22, 1998.  John Dingell, democrat from Michigan, stated, 
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183See Interview with Coleman, supra note 20. 
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their patients, must be held legally liable in state courts.187  They conclude that in a 
time of cost-conscious health care provision, only through legal punitive actions in 
state court, will the patient be assured quality health care.188  
To best understand both perspectives, this section explores three possible 
repercussions of the elimination of the preemption clause: a large increase in health 
care premiums, a proliferation in the number of uninsured Americans, and an 
increase in the number of patient initiated state law claims against third-party payors.  
1.  Increase in Health Care Premiums 
If the preemption clause is eliminated, an increase in health care premiums would 
result.  The degree of increase, however, is another, more amorphous, issue.  The 
third-party payor coalition argues that the elimination of the preemption clause will 
result in a drastic increase of health care premiums.  On the flip side, consumer 
advocates maintain that the rise in premiums will be minimal and that this issue is 
nothing but a scare tactic used to persuade Congress not to eliminate the preemption 
clause.  
Employers voluntarily provide health benefits as a means to recruit new 
employees and reward existing employees with quality health care.189  The coalition 
of third-party payors maintains that if the preemption clause is eliminated, third-
party payors will be exposed to unlimited financial liability for all coverage 
decisions, whether appropriate or inappropriate.190  They argue that the increased 
liability costs can only be offset by increasing premiums. 
A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study of proposed legislation that would 
eliminate the preemption clause found that “health plans and [self-insured 
employers] would be sued along with the providers . . . more frequently . . . because 
of the plan’s [self-insured employer’s] deep pockets.191  Self-insured employers 
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166 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 14:133 
argue this increased financial liability would require large sums of money to be spent 
on defending against the increased number of claims, thereby making it much less 
attractive, if not, unbearable, for self-insured employers to continue offering health 
benefits to their employees.192  They state that large sums of money spent on 
defending lawsuits from what they deem as baseless claims would be offset by 
increased premiums charged to plan participants.  In addition to the increase in 
medical negligence suits, the CBO office estimates that the cost of liability insurance 
would also increase dramatically: “every judicial decision awarding damages to a 
plaintiff for a plan’s coverage decision would increase the risk of suit for all other 
plans with similar coverage policies.”193  The CBO further estimates that the 
elimination of the preemption clause could increase liability costs by sixty- to 
seventy-five percent.194  Third-party payors argue if their costs of providing health 
benefits increase, the cost of health care premiums will rise with it.195  David 
Eubanks, the manager of benefits administration of a multinational corporation, 
maintains that “if the preemption clause is eliminated, a very complex system made 
up of inconsistent state interpretations of plan practices would result.  This system 
would in effect create a chaotic and expensive regulatory system.  One in which, 
multi-state employers could not afford to deal with.”196  Their ability to handle the 
estimated increased liability costs will be contingent on their ability to raise health 
care premiums. 
The consumer coalition maintains that third-party payors’ arguments are nothing 
but scare tactics, full of exaggerated fear mongering.  This coalition proffers an 
assortment of counter-arguments, dispelling third-party payors’ contentions on the 
bleak status of health care premiums if the preemption clause is eliminated.  First, 
this coalition argues that there are considerable costs attributed to the fact that 
medical negligence is not effectively legally deterred.  Jamie Court, director of 
Consumers for Quality Care, states, “Reforms that safeguard quality health care will 
save millions per year because it costs the health care system $60 billion per year to 
                                                          
16, 1998) <http://www.cbo.gov/ showdoc.cfm?index=667&sequence=o&from=6.htm>.  In 
addition to the increase in medical negligence suits, the CBO office estimates that liability 
insurance would increase dramatically, “every judicial decision awarding damages to a 
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192See HEALTH BENEFITS COALITION FOR AFFORDABLE CHOICE AND QUALITY, supra note 
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194See Id. 
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care for injuries due to medical negligence according to the Harvard School of Public 
Health.”197  Furthermore, according to Patricia M. Danzon, a noted economist:  
The malpractice system is costly and imperfect, but these defects are often 
exaggerated. The cost of malpractice—the real social cost of injuries 
occurring because of medical negligence—is many times greater than the 
more visible costs of insurance premiums and wasteful defensive 
practices.  Therefore in considering reform, the deterrence of malpractice 
must be considered at least as important as the cost of malpractice 
claims.198  
Moreover, assuming third-party payors’ liability costs will increase by “sixty-to 
seventy-percent,”199 the CBO conservatively estimates that this increase should only 
equate to a 1.4 percent increase in premium costs.200  Furthermore, a report on the 
impact of potential changes to ERISA, including elimination of the preemption 
clause, by the highly-regarded Kaiser Family Foundation, echoes the CBO’s 
sentiments and found that the increase in premiums would be minimal—0.03% to 
.011%.201  While the Kaiser Family Foundation admits that these figures could be 
conservative, questions must arise about the validity of the third-party payor 
coalition’s claim that if the preemption clause is eliminated, we will experience an 
8.6% increase in premiums.202 
The Kaiser Family Foundation report does dispel some of the fear created by 
third-party payors; yet Congress must remember that the foundation’s figures are 
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admittedly highly conditional.  The foundation acknowledges the high level of 
uncertainty in determining how exactly the health care market will react to the 
introduction of patient initiated state law claims against third-party payors.203 
In sum, third-party payors maintain that the elimination of the preemption clause 
will cause large increases in premiums and that these increases in premiums could 
heavily burden the nation’s health care system.  On the other hand, consumer 
activists counter by arguing that the fear of increased premiums is unfounded.  They 
echo Patricia Danzon’s comments in that the cost of deterrence of malpractice is as 
important as the deterrence of the cost of malpractice claims.204  While the increase 
in premiums argument remains unclear, it should be an important consideration that 
Congress takes into account when deciding the fate of the preemption clause.  
Congress must decide whether it deems a patient’s right to obtain legal redress in 
state court worthy enough to call the possible bluff of the third-party payors—and, if 
the third-party payors’ predictions are borne out, whether the federal government is 
willing to intervene and ensure that premiums do not rise too high so as to price the 
average patient out of the health care market altogether. 
2.  Proliferation of the Number of Uninsured Americans 
If Congress eliminates the preemption clause, there will undoubtedly be an 
increase in the costs of providing health benefits.205  In dealing with this increase, 
self-insured employers maintain that they have three options—raise premiums,206 
provide a lump sum of money every year to the employee rather than administer 
health benefits through the company,207 or eliminate health benefits altogether.208 
Self-insured employers argue that if premiums increase, unquestionably, some 
Americans will forgo the high costs of health care in favor of more immediate needs, 
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such as housing and food.  If self-insured employers decide that the cost of providing 
health care is too much to bear, yet still desire to remain in the health care benefits 
business, they might simply provide a lump sum each year to individual employees 
and encourage the employee to use this money for health insurance.  This could 
create more uninsured Americans.  Third-party payors claim that they fear that many 
employees will decline to use the money for health insurance.209  They fear that 
rather than care for their own health, they will spend the lump sum on the repayment 
of loans or a family vacation.210  Third-party payors also claim to fear that if the 
employee takes the money and uses it to purchase her family’s health insurance, 
without federal government intervention, she will be at a serious disadvantage in 
negotiating the prices and details of a health plan.  Not only will she lack the 
expertise needed to maneuver through the complicated maze of health care plans she 
also will lack the purchasing power of a large plan in negotiating a reasonable price 
with providers.  If self-insured employers exit the health care business altogether, 
this would unequivocally result in an increase in uninsured Americans. 
Third-party payors claim that any angle the self-insured employer takes will 
result in an increase in the number of uninsured Americans.211  In a recent survey 
conducted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 67% of the country’s employers said 
they would be forced to drop health care coverage if Congress renders moot the 
preemption clause.212  Furthermore, 81% of employers reported that they would drop 
health benefits if the costs increased at all.213  It goes without saying these figures are 
frightening.  What is even more disturbing is the fact that this country already has 
over forty-one million non-elderly, uninsured citizens,214 and over the past decade, 
this number has increased by a staggering ten million.215  Even more, at this time, 
eight out of ten of the uninsured citizens are full-time workers.216 
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When deliberating on the fate of the preemption provision, the possibility of 
increasing the number of uninsured Americans is, or, if not, should be, a serious 
concern for Congress.  According to the Kaiser Family Foundation report, health 
care directly relates to health outcomes and the financial well-being of families.217  
Even more, “[b]ecause [an uninsured citizen’s] primary health care needs are not 
addressed, the uninsured are more likely than those with insurance to be hospitalized 
for conditions that could have been avoided.”218 
Congress does, however, have choices when dealing with the current number of 
uninsured Americans and the disturbing predictions made by the self-insured 
employers.  Consumer advocates argue universal care, a form of socialized medicine 
made famous by President Clinton’s 1992 health care initiative, would ensure that all 
Americans would receive basic health care.  Uwe Reinhardt, James Madison 
professor of political economy at Princeton University, points out, Congress must 
look at universal care as a “real choice . . . between a government-run program that 
treats health care as an entitlement and a more conservative approach that treats 
health care as a private consumption good in which the rich are better off than the 
poor.”219  Consumer advocates argue that if the nation is truly fearful of a drastic 
increase in the number of  uninsured Americans, their concern should not punish 
patients by depriving them of their ability to hold third-party payors accountable; 
rather, their fear should fuel the debate supporting the need for universal care in this 
country. 
3.  Inflation in the Number of Patient Initiated State Law Claims Against Third-Party 
Payors 
The third possible repercussion from the elimination of the preemption clause, 
indirectly related to the prospect of premium increases, is that the state courts will be 
inundated with frivolous and costly lawsuits by patients in search of dipping into the 
deep pockets of third-party payors.220  Third-party payors contend that this would not 
only tax the state courts’ infrastructure, it would also lead to a large increase in 
premiums.221  Consumer advocates, however, argue that the introduction of state law 
claims against third-party payors covered by ERISA will not result in a large volume 
of cases, nor will it result in the predicted onslaught of state law claims against third-
party payors.222  They point to Texas, where no suits have been brought in the year 
since Texas became the first state to let people who have exhausted the available 
internal and external appeals sue third-party payors.223  As a result, Texas has 
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reported a rise in premiums at a paltry 0.1% per month.224  Third-party payors argue, 
however, that the number of suits brought in Texas will rise as soon as patients 
realize that they are able to sue third-party payors not covered by ERISA.225  With 
many of the arguments, predictions on the increase of state law claims and 
subsequent increase in premiums in Texas will only be bourne out as time passes.  
Congress, however, cannot discount what is occurring in our nation’s states as a 
symbol for what could lie ahead if the preemption clause is significantly altered or 
eliminated. 
In sum, as the health care industry evolves, so must legislation and the legal 
system that regulates it. The elimination of the preemption clause will permit state 
courts to delve into the negligent conduct by third-party payors, thereby ensuring 
legal remedies for those wronged.  Before acting prematurely, Congress should 
evaluate the cause and effect of such an action on the four central entities—patient, 
provider, self-insured employer, and managed care entities.  To clarify the possible 
repercussions of rendering moot the preemption clause, the next section explores 
how the elimination of the preemption clause impacts these four key players.226  
D.  How The Elimination Of The Preemption Clause Would Affect Four Entities—
The Patient, The Provider, the Self-Insured Employer, and Managed Care Entities.  
Because they are impacted the most the four most important entities in the fate of 
the preemption provision are the patient, the provider, the self-insured employer, and 
the managed care entities.227  This section considers the impact of Congress passing a 
measure permitting patients to sue third-party payors for damages under state law, 
thereby disrupting the bargain made between Congress and employers in 1974.228 
1.  The Patient 
The elimination of the preemption clause will, in the short term, enable the 
patient to enjoy a boon of newfound ability to access and receive quality health care, 
or sue if she doesn’t.  If the patient believed she was wronged, she would possess the 
ability to obtain monetary remedies for claims, such as negligent administration of a 
plan or wrongful death in state court.229  As a result, the patient would effectively 
gain another “check” in the checks and balances system of health care.  
Presumptively, this “check” should equate to a better opportunity for obtaining 
quality health care.  For example, an individual in legitimate, medically-necessary 
need of treatment should receive the care without an overriding concern that the 
utilization review agent will deny the claim, unless it desires to subject itself to the 
risk of state law claims.  While the short-term prospects look positive for patients, 
the long-term impact of such a measure is more suspect. 
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Larry Atkins, president of Health Policy Analysts, a Washington consulting 
group, states, “it’s impossible to assess the real cost of liability, but its passage would 
end managed care’s success in curbing health costs.”230  As aforementioned, there is 
a real possibility that the introduction of state law liability will cause an increase in 
premiums, thereby making it more expensive to obtain quality health care.231  More 
likely than not, the elimination of the preemption clause will create the same type of 
repercussions as was created by past government regulation of the health care 
industry.232  Health care costs would skyrocket and, without more government 
intervention, employers would exit the business of health care benefits altogether and 
take with them their purchasing power and their expertise in the business of health 
care.233  Arguably, the free-market-based health care system would be thrown into 
chaos and the patient could ultimately “get the shaft.”234  While this is one of many 
scenarios that could occur through blanket elimination of the preemption clause, by 
no means could it be the only outcome.  Either way Congress decides to act, as this 
article demonstrates, the stakes are high for the patient. 
2.  The Provider 
Senator Sibley from Waco, Texas, states, “why is it that doctors and nurses are 
accountable for their health care treatment decisions and managed care companies 
are not?”235  With this question, Senator Sibley touches the heart of what providers 
(doctors) gain from the elimination of the preemption clause. Doctors argue that the 
advent of utilization reviews and managed care has severely hampered their ability to 
provide ideal care.236  They advance legitimate concerns, such as a loss of control 
over medical decisions, increased restrictions on personal time, and the creation of 
financial incentives that strain their professional principles.237  If the preemption 
clause is eliminated, doctors believe that third-party payors would grow reluctant to 
interfere with the relationship between the physician and the patient, and they would 
regain some independence.238  Moreover, third-party payors would have to share the 
risk in providing medical care.239  
Third-party payors argue, however, that an increase in provider earning power is 
not in the best interest of the patient, nor of the nation.  They argue that if the clause 
is eliminated, doctors would gain in two ways. First, the provider would regain her 
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control over medical decisions.240  Second, by regaining control over their own 
practices providers would naturally be better able to earn more money which could 
mean that health care costs would again heavily burden our nation’s pocket-books.241  
It should be noted that there are providers who argue that the elimination of the 
preemption clause would do nothing to address root problems inherent in our health 
care system, such as expensive medication and inadequate standards of physician 
care.242  They maintain, therefore, at the cost of their own personal gains, the 
preemption clause should remain intact.243  This loose-fitting group of doctors state, 
“Allowing patients to sue health plans [and self-insured employers] . . . will . . . 
increase health care costs, further erode physician professional autonomy, encourage 
more lawsuits and make it harder to defend individual doctors in those lawsuits.”244  
In sum, the impact of the elimination of the preemption clause on the provider is 
unclear.  On one hand, the provider could gain freedom and earning power.  On the 
other hand, elimination could lead to “further erosion of [a doctor’s] autonomy” and 
increased difficulty in defending oneself from state law litigation which, in the long 
run, would further subject doctors’ expertise to that of someone who has no medical 
background.245  
3.  Self-Insured Employers 
If self-insured employers are subjected to state law actions, they argue that they 
would lose much of their ability to offer health care benefits to their employees.  
Furthermore, they posit that if the clause is eliminated, their 1974 compromise with 
Congress would be destroyed and, as a result, the federal government would likely 
have to, again, legislate large sums of money to care for the increasing numbers of 
uninsured Americans.  
The elimination of the preemption clause could lead to a mass exodus of self-
insured employers from the health-benefits business and subsequent increases in 
patient’s premiums.  However, as this article has demonstrated, there are two sides to 
every argument.  Self-insured employers readily admit that the provision of health 
benefits is basically a business decision, that benefits are both a means to ensure a 
productive work force and a means to recruit quality employees.  While repealing the 
preemption clause could lead to an increase in health care costs and premiums, it 
would do nothing to stifle these free market desires.  Despite the fact that self-
insured employers could now be held liable under state law, the desire to recruit 
quality employees and the need to ensure a healthy and positive workforce would 
remain. 
                                                                
240See Id. 
241See Id. 
242See Fisher, supra note 190, at 6. 
243See Id. 
244See Id.  
245See Id.  
174 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 14:133 
4.  Managed Care Entities 
Third-party payor lobbyists argue that managed care entities create payment 
systems and serve as a delivery mechanism in today’s health care landscape.246  They 
maintain that one would be hard-pressed to argue the benefits that have been brought 
to the table because of the introduction of the managed care entity into our health 
care system.247  For example, managed care entities have assisted our nation in 
stalling the ever-increasing costs of health care premiums.  After rising nearly 15% 
annually from 1988 to 1992, because managed care entities have become a mainstay 
in the market, health care premiums increased only by 0.5% from 1995 to 1996.248  
Managed care entities argue that if the preemption clause is eliminated, the positive 
effects gained over the past five years can be forgotten. 
Consumer advocates, however, reason if the preemption clause is eliminated, 
managed care entities, being a product of the free-market system, will evolve with 
the changing landscape simply because there remains a large amount of money to be 
earned when creating payment systems and administering health benefits.  
Furthermore, self-insured employers and other employers will attempt, although 
begrudgingly, to blunt the possibility of increased premiums in order to keep their 
own health care costs down.  Managed care entities, having responded to a market in 
search of health care premium stability, will once again respond to a market that also 
includes a possibility of liability in state courts. 
In sum, the entire preemption provision question is clouded in uncertainty.  The 
courts, the politicians, the patients, the providers, the self-insured employers, and 
managed care entities, are leery as to what exactly will happen, if and when 
Congress eliminates the preemption clause.  No one is certain how the health care 
market will react.  Even if the preemption provision was eliminated, it remains 
unclear what patient-employees’ reactions would be to their newly-acquired right to 
sue their employers under state law for negligent provision of their health care.249  
The only certainty is that the fate of the preemption clause lies within Congress and 
the legislative branch, not the judicial branch.  Furthermore, it is a forgone 
conclusion that self-insured employers and managed care entities will be adversely 
impacted, and the patients and the providers would both win and lose.250 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For our nation to move into the future, it must know and appreciate where it has 
been.  To know where it has been will enable the nation to navigate and succeed in 
the future.  This article views history as a tool for current national trials and 
tribulations, namely, the fate of the ERISA preemption clause.  It argues that when 
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deliberating on the fate of the preemption clause, Congress’s analysis must not be 
clouded by fear-mongering expressed by third-party payors and consumer advocates 
but rather, deliberation must be grounded in past regulatory lessons learned. 
Congress’s deliberation over the fate of the preemption clause is extremely 
important, impacting many different entities.  While recently growing annoyed with 
ERISA’s effect on patients, the federal courts, despite rare deviations, have remained 
anchored to their interpretation of the preemption clause.  But still, third-party 
payors’ decisions have life and death implications.  Therefore, Congress must take 
into account the serious implications of eliminating the preemption clause and 
delicately evaluate the pros and cons of such an action.  It must also analyze whether 
cases like Mrs. Garvey’s symbolize a substantive breakdown of the relationship 
between third-party payors, providers, and patients, or whether they represent 
anecdotal events marketed to the public so that entities, such as doctors and 
consumers, could prosper at the expense of the others interests. 
This article concludes by noting an age-old proverb of the Iroquois people.  Their 
proverb maintains that for every deliberation, one must consider the next seven 
generations.  In order to retain a quality health care system that provides care at an 
affordable price, Congress must consider the impact of eliminating the clause on “the 
next seven generations” rather than react to the third-party payors’ lobbyists or the 
consumer advocates’ emotions of the moment. 
In 1994, many political pundits believed with the election of the Republicans to a 
majority of seats in Congress, the public effectively rejected the idea of universal 
health care and sent a message to Congress that health care should be regulated 
through the “market place.”251  Whereas in 1999, sparked by the 1994 Republican 
effort to fund tax cuts with huge chunks of money taken from Medicare,252 the 
American public seems to have changed its mind on how exactly health care should 
be addressed.253  It appears that much of the public believes that the free-market 
system is not providing the checks and balances needed to ensure quality care at 
affordable costs; therefore, federal regulation may be necessary to ensure quality 
service at an affordable cost.254 
In an effort to address the preemption clause’s adverse impact on patient’s rights,  
Congress could re-visit the idea of universal health care.  This time, however, 
Congress could expand its vision of what universal health care could be.  Congress 
could eliminate the preemption clause so as to permit patients to obtain legal 
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remedies in state court.  Congress must simultaneously, however, provide financial 
subsidies to third-party payors to persuade them to work diligently in controlling the 
possible meteoric rise in costs of premiums and liability insurance.  If a third-party 
payor is abusing its discretion and committing an inordinate amount of negligent 
acts, the subsidy amount can be reduced accordingly.  This dual approach will not 
only provide quality health care to patients, but it will also provide a safety-net for 
those citizens unable to access affordable health care.  Admittedly, this proposal’s 
downside is that the American people are not likely prepared to pay additional taxes 
necessary to support such a subsidizing system.  Yet, when faced with the 
alternative, “the people” may have no choice. 
Perhaps the most logical and reasonable solution requires Congress to complete 
two tasks.  First, it must leave the preemption clause alone because its existence 
stems any chance of inconsistent standards and judgments. Furthermore, because the 
state courts never obtain jurisdiction, it stops any fear of an increase in state law 
claims that would be burdensome on state infrastructures.  Second, Congress must 
amend the civil enforcement mechanism located within ERISA.  As noted in the 
introduction, the civil enforcement mechanism currently provides the patient with 
compensation for refused medical procedures.  There is, however, no reason why 
Congress could not draft a clause providing punitive damages with a stipulation that 
damages cannot exceed five million dollars.  The cap will provide adequate remedy 
for the patient, serve as a punishment for negligent acts by third-party payors, and 
because federal courts retain jurisdiction, negate any possibility of inconsistent and 
biased state judgements.  Capped punitive damages and retention of the consistent 
and dependable federal courts should contain any possibility of an extreme increase 
in the cost of health care premiums. 
This proposal’s downside is the monetary cap amount.  For example, if this 
system was in place for Mrs. Garvey, how much should the cap allow for 
compensating her family for the loss of life?  Her husband, like most, would argue 
that five million dollars is not enough to compensate her family for the loss of a 
mother, a wife, a care-giver.  In sum, with regard to the monetary cap and third-party 
payors, the cap must be high enough to serve as a deterrent of future negligent 
actions, but low enough to permit third-party payors to withstand the health care 
business absent restrictive civil remedies. 
While proposals can be drafted and the future of health care can be debated, 
whether  Congress eliminates the preemption clause will not solve our health care 
crisis.  Uwe Reinhardt states, 
until the American public makes up its mind as to what it thinks health 
care is, the health- care system will remain irrational—[the public] 
want[s] an egalitarian health care system run by libertarian means” . . .  
“[T]he key question . . . is whether health care is a community 
service/public good or a private-consumer commodity.255  
In the past, health care reform has been driven by excess—excess beds, excess 
doctors, excess capacity—created by a series of well-intentioned, but poorly thought 
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out, government mandates.256  Americans must understand that within our current 
health care system, medical ethics clash with business profits.257  While the 
American people cry out for more care and “better care . . . for less money,”258 they 
forget, and perhaps do not understand that more care and “better care . . . for less 
money” are “inextricably linked.”259  If we eliminate the preemption clause, as David 
Broder, the Washington Post journalist, suggests,  
requiring insurers, providers (and employers) to do more inevitably means 
they will charge more.  Under our bifurcated system, some of the people 
who pay the bills (employers) will decide that the happiness of those who 
receive the services (patients) has become too expensive a luxury and will 
stop insuring them.”260  
Ruth Coleman states, “the words—managed health-care—is a misnomer . . . 
[rather] since World War II, what we have in this country is managed-health[care] 
finance, not managed-health care.”261  Until the nation decides which way it desires 
its health care system to evolve—universal or not universal—Congress’s simple 
deletion of the preemption clause from ERISA will be another example of “managed  
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health care finance” passed in the name of managed health care and sure enough, the 
patient will once again lose out. 
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